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INTRODUCTION 
Since the demise of press licensing in Britain 300 years 
ago, the U.K. has positioned itself as a vanguard of 
journalistic freedom—featuring a raucous and opinionated 
press—even in the absence of constitutional speech and press 
protections.2  Yet in January 2014, the World Association of 
Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA)—a leading 
press organization previously known for targeting press 
 
 2. See Editorial Bd., Britain’s Press Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/opinion/britains-press-
crackdown.html?. 
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censorship in repressive regimes such as Azerbajian and 
Myanmar—undertook an “unprecedented” fact-finding 
mission in the U.K. to investigate governmental threats to 
British press freedom.3  It did so because Britain is currently 
engaged in a press regulation effort that poses a significant 
threat to press freedom both in the U.K. and far beyond 
British shores.4 
The British press reform initiative began after 
revelations in 2011 that the Rupert Murdoch-owned tabloid 
News of the World had engaged in “industrial-scale”5 phone 
hacking, illegally intercepting the phone messages of 
thousands of unsuspecting people for years.6  Instead of 
responding to the phone hacking revelations by focusing on 
criminal law enforcement failures, however, the British 
government launched a wide-ranging, year-long Inquiry, 
headed by Lord Justice Brian Leveson, into the culture, 
practices, and ethics of the British newspaper press.7 
 
 3. Larry Kilman, International Delegation: UK Press Freedom Mission, 
WORLD ASSOCIATION OF NEWSPAPER AND NEWS PUBLISHERS (Nov. 8, 2013), 
http://www.wan-ifra.org/press-releases/2013/11/08/international-delegation-uk-
press-freedom-mission. 
 4. WAN-IFRA recently released a critical report about the reform of 
British press regulation.  WORLD ASSOCIATION OF NEWSPAPER AND NEWS 
PUBLISHERS, PRESS FREEDOM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 6 (Mar. 2014) 
[hereinafter WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM], available at http://www.wan-
ifra.org/microsites/press-freedom (“Even the suggestion of a decline in Britain’s 
regard for press freedom risks serious repercussions in other parts of the 
world.”). 
 5. John F. Burns, Phone-Hacking Charges Seen as Chill on British 
Journalism, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/world/europe/two-ex-editors-for-murdoch-
to-be-charged-for-phone-hacking.html?_r=0. 
 6. See Lili Levi, Journalism Standards and “The Dark Arts”: The U.K.’s 
Leveson Inquiry and the U.S. Media in the Age of Surveillance, 48 GA. L. REV. 
907, 909 (2014). 
 7. LEVESON INQUIRY: CULTURE, PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF THE PRESS, 
REPORT, 2012, H.C. 779, Executive Summary, ¶¶ 5, 7–9, (U.K.) [hereinafter 
LEVESON REPORT], available at http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/about/the-
report/.  The fallout from phone-hacking is still continuing.  See Katrin 
Bennhold & Alan Cowell, Ex-Tabloid Executive Acquitted in British Phone 
Hacking Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/25/world/europe/rebekah-brooks-found-not-
guilty-in-phone-hacking-case.html (describing result of phone-hacking trial of 
former tabloid editors Rebekah Brooks and Andy Coulson and noting potential 
upcoming legal actions); Martin Hickman, Revealed: 10 Police Inquiries into 
Illegal Data Techniques, INFORRM’S BLOG (July 12, 2014), available at 
https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/07/12/revealed-10-police-inquiries-into-
illegal-data-techniques-martin-hickman/ (detailing continuing police 
investigations into various journalism practices). 
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Having issued an almost 2000-page Report damning 
much of the newspaper press culture, Leveson called for a 
new plan of “voluntary” self-regulation backed up by a 
statutory oversight regime.8  Under the scheme, newspapers 
would independently establish a regulatory body, which 
would in turn seek recognition and continuing certification 
from a government-established certifying entity charged with 
ensuring that the press’ self-regulator properly followed the 
Leveson Report’s recommendations.  Currently, the Leveson-
recommended press oversight body has been established 
pursuant to a government-favored Royal Charter. 
Press resistance to the Royal Charter regime makes the 
ultimate contours and details of British press reform 
uncertain.  What is certain, however, is that some kind of 
Leveson-inspired reform is inevitable—certainly in light of 
Prime Minister David Cameron’s warning to newspapers 
that, otherwise, the press runs the risk of facing “hideous 
statutory regulation” in the future.9 
While designed to be modest and proportionate, the 
British effort to promote a “responsible” press via the Royal 
Charter regime in fact effectuates a power play by 
government and the political class against the press.  It 
introduces the Trojan horse of press control under the guise of 
“voluntary” self-regulation to restrain the excesses of tabloid 
journalism.  Its structural attempts to insulate such 
regulation from political influence are unlikely to be effective.  
The Royal Charter regime leads to predictable chilling effects 
on the press, without sufficient commensurate benefits in 
protecting press subjects’ privacy.  As a mid-twentieth 
century regulatory template proposed for a twenty-first 
century news environment,10 it ignores the multiplicity of 
press practices of the “networked Fourth Estate”11—raising 
questions about the scope of regulatory coverage as well as 
disciplinary uses of approved journalistic codes in today’s 
 
 8. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7. 
 9. Nicholas Watt, Cameron warns UK press: sign up to royal charter or 
else, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/26/cameron-warns-uk-press-
regulation. 
 10. See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 16. 
 11. See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle 
Over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311 
(2011) (coining the phrase). 
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diverse media context.  At the same time, it invites abuse by 
legacy press institutions, undermining press innovation by 
protecting incumbents. 
Arguing against the Leveson-influenced Royal Charter 
regulatory approach does not entail indiscriminate approval 
of egregious press practices.  It simply questions whether less 
restrictive alternatives to the regulatory option would not 
better balance the interests at issue. 
Regulatory institutions do not typically cede power; 
politicians hope to control press coverage to their advantage; 
press failures in accuracy and completeness are inevitable; 
and moral panics can always be generated in order to justify 
increased press oversight, when convenient.  It is not enough 
to hope that the new regulatory regime will operate with a 
light touch. 
The Royal Charter system cannot be evaluated without 
recognizing the interlocking realities against which it will 
function—diminished press power, and unprecedented efforts 
by government to intimidate newspapers from reporting on 
national security matters.  Indeed, such regulatory regimes 
can promote “new school” speech regulation, where 
governments can achieve their ends through partnerships 
with private power.12  The background threat of regulation 
can enable divide-and-conquer political strategies, effectively 
inviting journalistic loyalty oaths and generating a divided—
and thereby weakened—press.  Complex, multi-institutional 
breakdowns (such as those implicated in the phone hacking 
scandal) cannot properly be corrected by disproportionately 
regulating just one of the participant institutions.  Doing so is 
likely to accomplish little more than enhance the relative 
power of the others—a particularly dangerous development 
when it comes to the press. 
Certainly, misfeasance by government and the mighty is 
likely to rise even in the ordinary course if the press is not 
watching.  But threats to accountability reporting are more 
than typically worrisome today, when government actions 
most demand a powerful Fourth Estate.  The rise of the 
surveillance state, the fetishization of security, and enhanced 
governmental willingness to assert power all call for a strong 
 
 12. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 2296 (2014) (describing “new school” techniques to control and 
discipline speech in light of the digital infrastructure of communication today). 
328 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 55 
watchdog press operating in the public interest. 
This is not merely a local, U.K. matter.  A diminution in 
British press freedom “risks serious repercussions in other 
parts of the world.”13  By providing authoritarian regimes 
with press-repressive examples, Britain significantly 
diminishes its credibility in attempts to promote a broad 
notion of press freedom abroad. 
Part I of this Article sketches the history of British press 
regulation, describes the Leveson Report’s recommendations, 
and outlines the current status of press reform efforts in 
Britain.  Part II outlines the potentially worrisome aspects of 
the Royal Charter approach for the optimal role of the press, 
and concludes that the British press reform movement is 
likely to do more harm than good, both in the U.K. and 
globally. 
I. BRITISH PRESS REFORM, IN CONTEXT 
The “press” is primarily understood in the U.K. to refer to 
newspapers.  Although a number of government inquiries 
since the mid-twentieth century have sought to promote press 
responsibility, revelations in 2011 of phone hacking by tabloid 
newspapers triggered the most expansive assessment of the 
state of the British press.  As a result, a complex system of 
statute-backed industry self-regulation is currently being 
developed. 
A. Overview of the British Press Sector 
Britain boasts a large number of national newspapers, as 
well as regional and local outlets.14  British newspapers 
broadly fall into three categories: broadsheets,15 mid-market 
“compact” titles,16 and down-market tabloids.17  In terms of 
 
 13. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 6. 
 14. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, pt. C, ch. 2 (describing eight major 
publishers); THE NEWS MEDIA ASSOCIATION, http://www.newsmediauk.org/ (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2015) (compiling local and regional newspaper information). 
 15. Broadsheets include The Daily Telegraph, The Financial Times, The 
Guardian, and The Sunday Times.  The term “broadsheet” refers to the size and 
format of the newspaper, with long vertical pages.  Broadsheet, WIKIPEDIA, 
available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Broadsheet. 
 16. These include The Daily Mail and The Independent.  Compact 
(newspaper), WIKIPEDIA, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compact 
(newspaper). 
 17. The Sun, The Daily Mirror, and the now-shuttered News of the World 
are examples.  Rupert Murdoch closed down News of the World as a result of 
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content, the broadsheets are associated with serious 
journalism, in-depth coverage of hard news, and elite style.18  
At the opposite extreme are the “red-top” tabloids, whose 
coverage is image-heavy, sensationalistic, and focused on 
celebrity, the private lives of public people, human-interest 
stories, and “salacious sinfulness.”19  The black-top compacts 
sit somewhere in between, using broadsheet style yet also 
incorporating some entertainment into their pages.  The 
broadsheets represent the “responsible” press and are 
sometimes referred to as the “quality press,” by contrast to 
the tabloid “popular press.”20 
British newspapers are opinionated participants in public 
debate, with tabloids especially proud of their reputation as 
spirited and activist.21  Unlike broadcast news programs, 
partisanship and opinion are acceptable and expected in 
British newspapers.22  The British tabloids also range in their 
political and party affiliations.23 
B. The British Approach to Newspaper Regulation 
The Leveson Inquiry was not the first official 
 
the Leveson Inquiry into phone hacking.  See, e.g., Robert Mackey, British 
Tabloid to Close After More Serious Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2011), 
available at http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/more-serious-
allegations-against-british-tabloid-editors/?_r=0.  The mid-market papers are in 
tabloid rather than broadsheet physical format, but the mid-market offerings 
are distinguishable by their “black-top” masthead (as opposed to the “red-top” 
masthead of the down-market tabloids). 
 18. Broadsheet, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/23531?redirectedFrom=broadsheet#eid. 
 19. Rodney A. Smolla, Will Tabloid Journalism Ruin the First Amendment 
for the Rest of Us?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (1998).  Much 
has been written on tabloid journalism.  A WestlawNext search on September 
29, 2013 netted 138 titles.  See also John Fiske, Popularity and the Politics of 
Information, in JOURNALISM AND POPULAR CULTURE (Peter Dahlgren & Colin 
Sparks eds. 1992) (describing the complexity of tabloid media). 
 20. See PAPERBOY BLOG, UK Newspaper Guide, http://www.thepaper 
boy.com/uk/uk-newspaper-guide.cfm (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
 21. See, e.g., Karen Sanders & Mark Hanna, British Journalists, THE 
GLOBAL JOURNALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY 220–21 (David H. Weaver & Lars 
Willnat eds., 2012); Brett Mills, Tabloid Tales: Other News, Other Voices, 2003 
J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 23 (2003). 
 22. See, e.g., LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, pt. B, ch. 2, ¶ 5.7.  See also 
David Folkenflik, In London, A Case Study In Opinionated Press, NPR (Jan. 4, 
2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/01/04/132629428/in-london-a-case-
study-in-opinionated-press. 
 23. For a BBC description of political affiliation of major papers see BBC, 
The politics of UK newspapers (Sept. 30, 2009), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8282189.stm. 
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examination of the standards of the British newspaper press.  
Scandals regarding breaches of privacy and outrageous 
newsgathering techniques had led to six official examinations 
of the British newspaper press since World War II.24 
Official self-regulation of newspapers in Britain was 
initiated in 1953, when the newspaper industry established 
the General Council of the Press in response to a Royal 
Commission recommendation.25  Despite numerous 
subsequent efforts to improve the credibility of the self-
regulatory body, criticism persisted and the threat of 
statutory regulation was bandied about.  By 1991, the Home 
Office minister was warning that “the press—the popular 
press—is drinking in the Last Chance Saloon.”26  In response, 
the newspaper publishers established the Press Complaints 
Commission (PCC) as an independent body charged with 
maintaining and promoting a professional Code of Practice27 
by journalists, and dealing with complaints about breaches of 
the Code by newspapers and magazines.28  Membership in the 
 
 24. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, pt. D, ch. 1 (describing the 1947, 1962 
and 1974 Royal Commissions, the 1972 Younger Commission into Privacy, and 
the 1990 and 1993 assessments by a Departmental Committee chaired by Sir 
David Calcutt).  See also WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 10–12. 
 25. The Council had been tasked with defending press freedom and 
investigating complaints.  See CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, HOUSE 
OF COMMONS, PRESS STANDARDS, PRIVACY AND LIBEL, SECOND REPORT OF 
SESSION 2009–10, vol. 1, H.C. 362-I, at 115 (U.K.) [hereinafter CMS COMMITTEE 
SECOND REPORT].  The General Council of the Press was re-formed as the Press 
Council in 1962.  The Calcutt Inquiry in 1990 recommended its replacement 
with a Press Complaints Commission.  Id. 
 26. See Roy Greenslade, A decade of diplomacy, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 4, 
2001), available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2001/feb/05/mondaymedi 
asection.pressandpublishing. 
 27. The Code of Practice enforced by the PCC is written and revised by the 
Editors’ Code Committee, consisting of the Chairman and Director of the PCC 
as well as editors of national, regional, and local newspapers.  CMS COMMITTEE 
SECOND REPORT, supra note 25, at 115.  By contrast to the membership of the 
PCC, the Editors’ Code Committee has no lay members (except the Chairman 
and Director of the PCC).  Id. 
 28. CMS COMMITTEE SECOND REPORT, supra note 25.  See also LEVESON 
REPORT, supra note 7, pt. D, ch. 2.  The self-regulatory system regulating 
newspapers has consisted of three parts for the past decade: the PCC, the 
Editors’ Code Committee, and the Press Board of Finance (known as the 
PressBoF).  The PCC disbanded in September 2014, and was replaced by IPSO, 
the Independent Press Standards Organization.  PRESS COMPLAINTS 
COMMISSION, http://www.pcc.org.uk (last visited Jan. 12, 2015).  Until then, the 
board of the PCC had consisted of ten lay members and seven editors.  CMS 
COMMITTEE SECOND REPORT, supra note 25, at 115.  The system was financed 
through the PressBoF, with funding by a levy paid by member newspapers and 
magazines.  Id.  The PCC assessed complaints to determine compliance with the 
2015] TAMING THE “FERAL BEAST” 331 
PCC was voluntary, although most major papers belonged.29 
The Leveson Report issued a scathing indictment of the 
PCC, principally on the grounds that it was insufficiently 
independent of the press industry and not a true regulator.30  
As a result of widespread criticism, the PCC announced in 
2012 that it would move into a transitional phase before 
disbanding.31  As is further detailed below, the PCC has now 
been replaced by IPSO, the newspaper industry’s 
Independent Press Standards Organization.32 
C. Phone-Hacking and the Leveson Inquiry Into the 
Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press 
Prime Minister David Cameron appointed the Leveson 
Inquiry in July 2011 with a wide-ranging remit.33  Chairman 
Justice Leveson himself characterized it as “almost 
breathtaking in its width.”34  After a year of taking testimony, 
Justice Leveson issued a four-volume Report of its inquiry 
into the culture, practices, and ethics of the press.35  Having 
diagnosed a systemic cultural problem with the operations of 
the press—and particularly the tabloids—Leveson sought to 
resolve it by a series of recommendations designed to be more 
 
Code.  If it found a breach, the offending newspaper could offer to resolve the 
complaint, but if its offer was deemed unsatisfactory, the PCC could adjudicate 
the case and the newspaper would be obliged to publish the PCC adjudication 
“with due prominence.”  Id. at 116. 
 29. CMS COMMITTEE SECOND REPORT, supra note 25, at 115.  Northern & 
Shell, owners of The Daily Express, The Daily Star and OK! Magazine, 
withdrew from the PCC in 2011.  See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 
4, at 12. 
 30. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶¶ 41–46.  The 
PCC system had been subject to critique since its inception, including by its 
inventor, Sir David Calcutt, who concluded in a second report in 1993 that self-
regulation was not working and recommended statutory regulation instead.  Id. 
at 116–17.  WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 11. 
 31. Press Release, Press Complaints Commission, PCC transition to a new 
regulatory body (Mar. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.pcc.org.uk/news/?article=NzcyNA==.  See also LEVESON REPORT, 
supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶ 41.  The PCC continued to resolve cases 
and enforce its Editors’ Code of Ethics, and issued a report of 2012 complaint 
statistics prior to its closure.  Press Release, Press Complaints Commission, 
PCC publishes 2012 complaints statistics, available at 
http://www.pcc.org.uk/news/index.html?article=ODQ3MA==. 
 32. See infra pt. I, § D(2). 
 33. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, pt. A, ch. 1, ¶¶ 1.2–.4. 
 34. Id. pt. A, ch. 2, ¶ 1.9. 
 35. See id. pt. A, ch. 1–3 (describing the inquiry); id. pt. A, ch. 4 (describing 
the Report). 
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effective than the prior six attempts at press reform.  
Determined that his Report not find a place “on the second 
shelf of a journalism professor’s study,”36 Lord Justice 
Leveson sought to craft a “genuinely independent and 
effective system of self-regulation.”37 
In the meantime, the police continued to investigate 
possible illegal behavior by journalists (such as phone 
hacking and bribing officials for information)38—and prior 
investigations began coming to fruition with criminal trials 
for numerous press defendants.39 
The British public and politicians mobilized and 
expressed intense interest—as evidenced, inter alia, by the 
many articles on the subject appearing in the Guardian 
newspaper alone.40  Celebrities such as J.K. Rowling and 
Sienna Miller pushed publicly for press regulation in favor of 
 
 36. John Plunkett & Josh Halliday, Leveson inquiry: Jeremy Paxman, 
Andrew Marr, Lord Reid appear, THE GUARDIAN (May 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/blog/2012/may/23/leveson-inquiry-paxman-
marr-live?CMP=twt_fd (describing Justice Leveson’s response to witness). 
 37. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary,¶ 51. 
 38. See, e.g., REUTERS, Police investigating Trinity Mirror over phone 
hacking liability (Sept. 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-trinity-mirror-hacking-idUSBRE9 
8B06A20130912; Daniel Miller, Police investigating 600 new phone-hacking 
incidents at the News of the World ‘after suspect turns supergrass,’ DAILY MAIL 
(Mar. 16, 2013), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2294305/Police-investigating-600-new-phone-hacking-incidents-News-World-
suspect-turns-supergrass.html (describing Operation Weeting as now likely to 
extend until 2015). 
 39. Lisa O’Carroll, Rebekah Brooks trial over phone-hacking charges 
delayed, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/22/rebekah-brooks-phone-hack-
trial-delayed.  Recently, former NEWS OF THE WORLD chief executive Rebekah 
Brooks was acquitted and former editor Andrew Colson convicted after an eight-
month phone-hacking trial.  Lisa O’Carroll & Patrick Wintour, Andy Coulson 
guilty over phone hacking as Rebekah Brooks walks free, THE GUARDIAN (June 
24, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/24/andy-
coulson-rebekah-brooks-phone-hacking-trial; Bennhold & Cowell, supra note 7; 
Alan Cowell & Katrin Bennhold, Andy Coulson Gets 18 Months in Tabloid 
Phone Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/world/europe/andy-coulson-to-be-sentenced-
in-phone-hacking-case.html.  Phone hacking trials of other defendants continue.  
See, e.g., Lisa O’Carroll, Ex-Sunday Mirror journalist charged with phone 
hacking, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/15/sunday-mirror-journalist-
phone-hacking. 
 40. For a gateway to THE GUARDIAN’s archive of Leveson and phone-
hacking related articles, see THE GUARDIAN, US media, 
http://www.theguardian.com/media (last visited Jan. 12, 2015). 
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privacy.41  Victim-representing groups, such as Hugh Grant-
fronted Hacked Off, emerged with the goal of promoting the 
passage of press regulatory reform.42 
Although it acknowledged the importance of a free press 
and the extent to which the British press had fulfilled its 
important mission,43 the Leveson Report found significant 
flaws in the culture, ethics, and practices of the newspaper 
press leading to “press behaviour that, at times, can only be 
described as outrageous.”44 
The Report identified problems on three fronts: in 
newsgathering, reporting, and the attitude of the press.  
Newsgathering too often involved not just phone-hacking, but 
also covert surveillance, blagging,45 deception, excessive 
persistence (through tactics such as door-stepping, chases by 
photographers, insistent phone calls), illegal trade in personal 
information, and some instances of police bribery “in 
circumstances where it is extremely difficult to see any public 
interest justification.”46 
As for reporting, the press sometimes “reckless[ly] . . . 
prioriti[zed] sensational stories, almost irrespective of the 
harm [they could cause], all the while heedless of the public 
interest[,]”47 published private information without consent, 
showed reckless disregard for accuracy, and engaged in 
misrepresentation, embellishment, and distortion.48 
With respect to the press’ attitude in response to 
complaints, the Report identified a lack of respect for privacy 
 
 41. See Lisa O’Carroll, Leveson phone-hacking inquiry: JK Rowling among 
‘core participants’, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/sep/14/leveson-phone-hacking-inquiry-
jk-rowling. 
 42. See HACKED OFF, http://hackinginquiry.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2015) 
(Hacked Off’s home page). 
 43. See, e.g., LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶¶ 5, 8–
9. 
 44. Id. ¶ 7. 
 45. The Leveson Report defines “blagging” as “deception.”  Id. pt. A, ch. 2, ¶ 
1.6. The Oxford Dictionaries online define “blagging” as “obtain[ing] (something) 
by using persuasion or guile.”  Blag, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, available at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/english/blag. 
 46. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶ 34.  Of course, 
many of these behaviors are illegal and subject to civil and/or criminal 
punishment (as the criminal trial of Rebekah Brooks and Andrew Coulson 
demonstrates). 
 47. Id.¶ 32. 
 48. Id. ¶¶ 32, 38. 
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and dignity;49 a “cultural tendency within parts of the press 
vigorously to resist or dismiss complainants almost as a 
matter of course[;]”50 a refusal to investigate even charges of 
systemic criminality;51 a propensity of newspapers under 
attack to attack their attackers (thereby intimidating and 
deterring complainants);52 a hesitancy to break ranks and 
criticize other papers’ practices;53 and a failure of governance 
and compliance systems that might have averted 
misbehavior.54  The Report highlighted the press’ lack of 
remorse and defensive failure to self-examine as factors 
exacerbating the underlying newsgathering and reporting 
errors it described.55 
The Leveson Report recommended the establishment of 
an independent regulatory body tasked with “the dual roles of 
promoting high standards of journalism and protecting the 
rights of individuals.”56  An independent Board, whose chair 
and members would be selected by an appointment panel, 
would govern the body.  In turn, that Board’s members would 
be independent of both the industry and government and 
selected in an independent manner.57  While the Board should 
include “people with relevant expertise,” there should be no 
serving editors on the Board and its majority should be 
independent of the press.58 
The new self-regulatory body would have a multitude of 
roles, including: creating and enforcing a standards code; 
defining and issuing guidance on the public interest and the 
code; requiring appropriate internal governance processes; 
enabling whistle-blowing reporting mechanisms; adjudicating 
individual complaints; investigating, on its own initiative, 
serious or systemic breaches of the code and failures to 
comply with its directives; providing pre-publication advice to 
editors; directing the nature, extent and placement of 
apologies; and operating an arbitration service to deal with 
 
 49. Id. ¶ 36 (speaking specifically about NEWS OF THE WORLD). 
 50. Id. ¶ 39. 
 51. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶¶ 21–22. 
 52. Id. ¶¶ 34, 39. 
 53. Id. ¶ 23. 
 54. Id. ¶¶ 31, 36. 
 55. Id. ¶ 39. 
 56. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, ¶ 57. 
 57. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶¶ 1–5; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.8. 
 58. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 4; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶¶ 4.6, 4.10. 
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civil law claims.59  In drafting the code of practice, the Board 
could be advised by a Code Committee that could include (but 
not be limited to) serving editors. 
In turn, the code to be adopted by the Board would take 
into account the importance of freedom of speech, the 
interests of the public (including the public interest in 
detecting or exposing crime or serious impropriety, protecting 
public health and safety and preventing the public from being 
seriously misled) and the rights of individuals.60 
As for complaints, unlike the PCC’s limited jurisdiction to 
hear complaints only from the victims of press breaches, the 
new Board would have the power “to hear complaints 
wherever they come from” including “a representative group 
affected by the breach, or a third party seeking to ensure 
accuracy of published information.”61 
The Board would have the right to require remedial 
action such as corrections or apologies, the prerogative to 
require compilation and public availability of code compliance 
data,62 the authority to investigate systemic or serious 
breaches, and the power to impose “appropriate and 
proportionate sanctions, (including financial sanctions up to 
1% of turnover with a maximum of £1M)” for “serious or 
systemic breaches of the standards code or governance 
requirements of the body.”63 
The Leveson Report also made specific recommendations 
for consideration by the body.  For instance, it suggested a 
clearer statement of the standards to be expected of editors 
and journalists than is in the current Editors’ Code of 
 
 59. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶¶ 7–20; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶¶ 4.21–
4.36. 
 60. Id. at Executive Summary, ¶ 8; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.23.  The code “must 
cover standards of: (a) conduct, especially in relation to the treatment of other 
people in the process of obtaining material; (b) appropriate respect for privacy 
where there is no sufficient public interest justification for breach; and (c) 
accuracy, and the need to avoid misrepresentation.”  Id. at Executive Summary, 
¶ 8.  See also Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press sched. 3, ¶ 8, Oct. 
30, 2013 [hereinafter Royal Charter], available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/2
54116/Final_Royal_Charter_25_October_2013_clean__Final_.pdf. 
 61. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 11; 
id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.30. 
 62. There would also be reporting requirements for the Board.  Id. at 
Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 15; id. pt. K, ch. 7,¶ 4.42. 
 63. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 19; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.38. 
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Practice adopted under the auspices of the PCC.64  It 
indicated that the body “should make it clear that 
newspapers will be strictly accountable, under their 
standards code, for any material that they publish, including 
photographs (however sourced).65  It also recommended that 
the new self-regulatory body should provide a service to warn 
the press, broadcasters, and photographers “when an 
individual has made it clear that they do not welcome press 
intrusion.”66  In addition to requiring the body to “provide 
guidance on the interpretation of the public interest that 
justifies what would otherwise constitute a breach of the 
Code[,]”67 the Report recommended that when  the public 
interest justification is to be relied on to excuse a breach of 
the code, “a record should be available of the factors weighing 
against and in favour of publication, along with a record of 
the reasons for the conclusions reached.”68 
As the new regulatory body would lack credibility if the 
majority of newspaper publishers did not subscribe, the 
Leveson Report also described “carrot-and-stick” incentives 
designed to promote participation.  The principal carrot for 
membership in the regulatory body was that, in lieu of 
expensive litigation, subscription would entitle members to 
the exclusive use of a “fair, fast and inexpensive arbitration 
service” operating under the auspices of the regulatory body.69  
On the “stick” side of the model, the Report provided that 
newspapers choosing not to join the new body would be 
disadvantaged in three ways.  They would not have access to 
the cheap, expert, and rapid arbitral process.70  Once in court 
in defamation, privacy, breach of confidence, or other media 
 
 64. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 36.  See also id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶¶ 
4.18–4.24 (discussing the problems with the old code and the need for a clearer 
alternative). 
 65. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 40; id. pt. K, ch. 9, ¶ 2.9. 
 66. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 41; 
id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.35. 
 67. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 42; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.24. 
 68. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 43; id. pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 4.24. 
 69. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 26; id. pt. K, ch.7. ¶ 5.5.  The 
Report stated that if an arbitration arm were not created, then qualified one-
way cost shifting would be introduced for defamation, breach of confidence, 
privacy and similar media-related litigation, as proposed by Justice Jackson.  
Id. pt. J, ch. 3, § 6.  See also Royal Charter, supra note 60, sched. 3. 
 70. See LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, Summary of Recommendations, ¶¶ 
26, 67. See also id. pt. J,  ch. 3, ¶¶ 6.7–6.8, 6.10 (describing the benefits of the 
arbitration process to a publisher and its strength as an incentive). 
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tort cases, they would be liable for exemplary damages if they 
lost.71  If they won, they would not be eligible to receive cost 
recovery as currently available, and could be required to pay 
costs.72 
In its most controversial aspect, the Leveson Report 
recommended Parliamentary enactment of a statutory 
underpinning, which would identify the legitimate 
requirements of an independent self-regulatory body and 
“provide a mechanism to recognise and certify that a new 
body meets them.”73  The requirements for recognition would 
be the Leveson Report recommendations.  An independent 
recognition body would assess—both at its inception and 
thereafter as well—whether the self-regulatory body was 
designed and operated to satisfy the statutory requisites. 
D. Where Things Stand Now 
After the Leveson Report’s release, Prime Minister David 
Cameron quickly rejected the recommended statutory 
underpinning, saying that statutory press regulation would 
“cross the Rubicon” and undo centuries of press freedom.74  
Yet Labour and the Liberal Democrats supported Leveson.75  
During cross-party talks, it was suggested that 
Parliamentary legislation underpinning the recognition body 
could be avoided if the body were established under a Royal 
Charter similar to that which established the BBC or the 
British Council.76  The ensuing Royal Charter on Self-
 
 71. Id. at Summary of Recommendations, ¶ 68. 
 72. Id. ¶ 67–69. 
 73. Id. ¶ 27; id. pt. K, ch.7, ¶ 6.4. 
 74. See, e.g., Lisa O’Carroll, Leveson report: what happened next – Q&A, 
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/feb/12/leveson-what-happened-next. 
 75. Lisa O’Carroll, Defamation bill set to be lost due to ‘Leveson’ clause, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 05, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/mar/05/defamation-bill-leveson-clause. 
 76. Id.  The Royal Charter alternative is widely attributed to Oliver Letwin, 
a Cabinet Office minister in the Cameron government.  See, e.g., Charlie Potter, 
Press regulation: all you need to know, 24 B.J.R. no. 1, 15, at 16 (2013).  Royal 
Charters, granted by the sovereign on the advice of the Privy Council, have a 
history dating back to the thirteenth century.  PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, 
Chartered bodies, available at http://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/royal-
charters/chartered-bodies/; PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, Privy Council members, 
available at http://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/privy-council/privy-council-
members/.  Membership in the Privy Council is for life, but “only Ministers of 
the democratically elected Government of the day participate in its policy work.”  
PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, Overview, available at 
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Regulation of the Press ultimately received royal assent on 
October 30, 2013.77 
In addition to the Royal Charter initiative, Parliament 
adopted two pieces of legislation designed to further 
Leveson’s proposed press reform system: (1) amendments to 
the Crimes and Courts Act 2013 effectuating the costs and 
exemplary damages incentive provisions proposed by 
Leveson,78 and (2) a provision in the Regulatory Reform Act 
designed to establish a super-majority vote requirement for 
Parliamentary amendments to the press regulatory system.79 
1. The Royal Charter 
The Leveson Report did not recommend the Royal 
Charter.  Instead, the Royal Charter approach was a “half-
 
http://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/privy-council/.  By convention, the Queen 
in Council follows the advice of her ministers on the Privy Council.  Id.  Once 
the only means of incorporating a body, royal charters are now “comparatively 
rare.”  PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, Chartered bodies, available at 
http://privycouncil.independent.gov.uk/royal-charters/chartered-bodies/.  See 
also PATRICK O’CONNOR QC, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE PRIVY 
COUNCIL AND THE PREROGATIVE 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.justice.org.uk/data/files/resources/35/The-Constitutional-Role-of-the-
Privy-Council-26-January-2009-.pdf. 
 77. Royal Charter, supra note 60; Patrick Wintour, Press regulation royal 
charter given go-ahead by the Queen, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2013), available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/30/press-regulation-royal-
charter-approval. See also INFORRM’S BLOG, The Privy Council and the Royal 
Charters: how does it all work? (Oct. 8, 2013), 
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/10/08/the-privy-council-and-the-cross-party-
charter-some-background/#more-22794; Josh Halliday & Mark Sweney, Royal 
charter: political parties reach deal on press regulation system, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/11/royal-charter-press-regulation-
final-draft-newspapers. 
 78. See Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c. 22, pt. 2, §§ 34–42 (U.K.), available 
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/contents/enacted.  See also 
Potter, supra note 76, at 15–23. 
 79. This measure prohibited amendment or dissolution of the Charter 
without compliance with its required two-thirds super-majority Parliamentary 
vote.  This was intended as reassurance to the press that the regulatory system 
would be independent of politicians.  See Potter, supra note 76.  The others were 
the provisions (now in the Crime and Courts Act, 2013) offering protection to 
“relevant publishers” who had opted in to the new system from legal costs in 
certain media civil cases, and permitting courts to impose exemplary damages 
in such cases on “relevant publishers” who had not opted for membership.  Id.  
The cases to which these financial incentives would apply are media-related: 
libel, slander, breach of confidence, privacy, malicious falsehood, and 
harassment.  Id. 
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way house” alternative,80 designed to avoid Parliamentary 
involvement in press regulation while ensuring compliance 
with the Leveson Report’s recommendations.81  After a 
politically-charged year of failed compromise and contending 
draft Royal Charters,82 the revised Royal Charter established 
the legal framework for the regulatory structure 
recommended by the Leveson Report.83 
The Royal Charter inaugurates a Recognition Panel 
charged with recognition of press industry self-regulators in 
accordance with the terms of the Charter.84  The Recognition 
Panel is to evaluate applications for recognition from 
regulators, review whether regulators granted recognition 
should continue to be certified, and report on the success or 
failure of the recognition system.85  Pursuant to the Charter, 
 
 80. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 12. 
 81. Id. (“The Royal Charter was proposed as a means to ‘take parliament 
out of the equation[.]’ ”). 
 82. After discussions involving all three political parties as well as press 
regulation activists Hacked Off, a cross-party draft Royal Charter was released 
in March 2013.  Draft Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, Mar. 18, 
2013, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leveson-report-
draft-royal-charter-for-proposed-body-to-recognise-press-industry-self-regulator.  
The draft charter largely reflected the Leveson approach.  See generally id.  The 
newspaper publishers offered their contending proposed charter, which watered 
down some of the Leveson Report’s recommendations.  Society of Editors, Draft 
Royal Charter for the Independent Self-Regulation of the Press, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/interactive/2013/apr/25/draft-alternative-
royal-charter-press-regulation.  For comparisons of the contending proposed 
Royal Charters, see, for example, Potter, supra note 76; MEDIA STANDARDS 
TRUST, THE CROSS-PARTY ROYAL CHARTER VS THE PRESSBOF ROYAL CHARTER: 
A COMPARISON (2013), available at www.mediastandardstrust.org.  The 
newspaper industry Royal Charter alternative was ultimately rejected by a 
committee of the Queen’s Privy Council.  See Letter from Danny Alexander, 
Chief Sec’y to the Treasury, and Maria Miller, Sec’y of State for Culture, Media 
and Sport, Dep’t for Culture, Media & Sport, to Richard Tilbrook, Clerk of the 
Privy Council (Oct. 8, 2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/recommendation-on-pressbof-
petition-for-royal-charter—2.  The newspaper industry sought an appeal of that 
decision.  See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 17. Both that 
appeal and a previous request by the newspaper industry for judicial review of 
the royal charter process were denied.  See Lisa O’Carroll, Press regulation: 
Newspapers lose court of appeal battle over rival royal charter, THE GUARDIAN 
(May 1, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/may/0 
1/press-regulation-newspaper-court-appeal-royal-charter. 
 83. Because the Royal Charter is designed to effectuate the Leveson 
Report’s press regulatory structure, this Article refers interchangeably to the 
Royal Charter and Leveson regulatory approaches. 
 84. Royal Charter, supra note 60. 
 85. Id. ¶ 4.1. 
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and through the work of an appointment committee 
established by the Commissioner for Public Appointments,86 a 
chairman of the press recognition panel was appointed87 and 
the full body installed as of November 3, 2014.88 
The press’ response to the Royal Charter scheme has 
been overwhelmingly negative, with numerous articles 
characterizing the Charter’s Leveson-reliant approach as the 
end of press freedom in Britain.89  In addition to substantive 
concerns, the newspaper industry has objected to the political 
process behind the Royal Charter, suggesting that it excluded 
the press, reflected manipulation at the hands of politicians 
and interest groups with political agendas targeting the 
popular press,90 and evaded parliamentary debate and 
 
 86. See COMMISSIONER FOR PUBLIC APPOINTMENTS, Press Self-Regulation, 
http://publicappointmentscommissioner.independent.gov.uk/press-self-
regulation/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2015).  See also Roy Greenslade, Words of 
Leveson open to interpretation amid the mud-slinging, LONDON EVENING 
STANDARD (Jan. 29, 2014), available at 
http://www.standard.co.uk/business/media/words-of-leveson-open-to-
interpretation-amid-the-mudslinging-9092913.html. 
 87. Dr. David Wolfe, QC was appointed as the inaugural chairman of the 
recognition panel.  Roy Greenslade, Barrister David Wolfe to chair the press 
regulation recognition panel, THE GUARDIAN (June 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jun/26/press-regulation-
ipso; PRESS RECOGNITION PANEL, http://pressrecognitionpanel.org.uk/word/ 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2015). 
 88. See, e.g., Roy Greenslade, Royal Charter’s ‘press recognition panel’ 
recruits five board members, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/oct/31/press-regulation-
leveson-report. 
 89. See, e.g., Tim Shipman & Gerri Peev, Approved behind closed doors, 
curbs that end three centuries of Press freedom, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 30, 2013), 
available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2480676/Approved-closed-
doors-curbs-end-centuries-Press-freedom.html.  See also DR. GORDON NEIL 
RAMSEY, HOW NEWSPAPERS COVERED PRESS REGULATION AFTER LEVESON – 
MEDIA STANDARDS TRUST ANALYSIS, MEDIA STANDARDS TRUST (Sept. 4, 2014) ) 
[hereinafter MEDIA STANDARDS TRUST REPORT], available at 
http://mediastandardstrust.org/mst-news/how-newspapers-covered-press-
regulation-after-leveson-media-standards-trust-analysis/ (describing extensive, 
negative and “polarized” coverage of the issue). 
 90. Newspapers have claimed that the cross-party talks leading to the 
March 2013 proposed cross-party charter involved Hacked Off, but not the 
press, and therefore were skewed from their inception.  See, e.g., James 
Chapman, Unveiled, a tough new watchdog to preserve freedom of the Press: 
Newspapers launch own Royal Charter with teeth to protect the public - and 
independence to prevent political meddling, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 25, 2013), 
available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2314971/Freedom-press-
Newspapers-launch-Royal-Charter-teeth-protect-public.html.  See also WAN-
IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 14–15. 
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opportunity for public consultation.91  In turn, Charter 
proponents have vociferously accused the newspaper 
publishers of failing to cover press regulation fairly and 
exaggerating the threats posed by the Royal Charter system 
simply in order to maintain their own unaccountable power.92  
There is a  “high level of animosity” between the two 
positions.93 
2. IPSO and IMPRESS 
Against the backdrop of competing draft Royal Charters, 
the newspaper publishers announced the launching of 
IPSO—the Independent Press Standards Organization—to 
which a majority of the industry had pledged to subscribe.94  
Although a few major newspapers, such as The Guardian, 
The Independent, and the Financial Times, have chosen not 
to join IPSO at this point,95 the IPSO organization debuted in 
September 2014.96  The IPSO appointments panel has been 
established and its inaugural chair appointed.97 
 
 91. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 15. 
 92. See generally HACKED OFF, http://hackinginquiry.org/ (last visited Jan. 
12, 2015).  See also MEDIA STANDARDS TRUST REPORT, supra note 89. 
 93. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 14. 
 94. See, e.g., Lisa O’Carroll, Press industry pushes ahead with new regulator 
despite political deadlock, THE GUARDIAN (July 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/jul/08/press-industry-new-regulator.  
See also NEWS UK, Independent Press Standards Organization (July 8, 2013), 
available at http://www.news.co.uk/2013/07/independent-press-standards-
organisation/.  See also WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 17–18. 
 95. See Editorial, The Guardian view on the new press regulator, Ipso, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/04/guardian-view-new-
press-regulator-ipso (explaining THE GUARDIAN’s position); Roy Greenslade, 
Financial Times rejects Ipso in favour of its own editorial complaints system, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/apr/17/press-regulation-
financialtimes (describing Financial Times’ decision regarding IPSO 
membership).  The papers’ decision to wait seems less due to a preference for a 
Leveson body under the cross-party Royal Charter as opposed to a concern that 
IPSO would be controlled by News UK, Associated Newspapers and Telegraph 
Media Group—the biggest national newspapers.  Mark Sweney, Guardian 
rejects press watchdog as ‘own goal’ threatening independence, THE GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 6, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/aug/06/g 
uardian-rejects-press-watchdog-threatens-independence. 
 96. INDEPENDENT PRESS STANDARDS ORGANIZATION, https://www.ipso.co.u 
k/IPSO/index.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2015). 
 97. See Greenslade, supra note 87 (noting appointment of outgoing appeals 
court judge Sir Alan Moses as inaugural IPSO chair).  Newspaper Society, 
Appointment Panel Invites Applications for IPSO Chair Role, SOCIETY OF 
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Promising that IPSO “will be a complete break with the 
past, and will deliver all the key Leveson recommendations,” 
the publishers offered constitutional documents.98  A press 
release declared that IPSO would have powers to impose fines 
of up to £1 million for serious and systemic wrongdoing and 
ensure that corrections and adjudications were published 
“whether editors like it or not.”99  IPSO has a majority of 
independent members at every level, and no industry veto on 
appointments.100 
Nevertheless, IPSO has attracted criticism as 
insufficiently independent of publishers and insufficiently 
distinct from the now-defunct PCC.101  Critics devote much 
attention to the funding structure of IPSO, which depends on 
 
EDITORS (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.newspapersoc.org.uk/06/fe 
b/14/appointment-panel-invites-applications-for-ipso-chair-role.  See also Mark 
Sweney, Press regulator Ipso names its board, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2014), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/may/28/press-regulator-
ipso-board-ros-altmann-charles-wilson. 
 98. See O’Carroll, supra note 94. 
 99. Id.  The final Articles of Association, Regulations, and Financial 
Sanctions Guidance Independent Press Standards Organization are available at 
IPSO’s website.  https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/aboutipso.html. 
 100. See https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/whoweare.html#Board.  There are 
seven non-industry directors on IPSO’s board, with five publishing 
representatives.  See Articles of Association of Independent Press Standards 
Organization C.I.C., ¶ 22.1, available at https://www.ipso.co.uk/ass 
ets/1/IPSO_Articles_of_Association.pdf.  See also Roy Greenslade, Publishers 
advertise for chair of new press regulator, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2014), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/feb/03/press-
regulation-ipso.  Former judge Sir Alan Moses is the inaugural chair of IPSO.  
Lisa O’Carroll, Sir Alan Moses appointed as Ipso chair, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 
2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/apr/29/sir-alan-
moses-ipso-chair-pcc. The appointment of the Chair was made by the 
Appointment Panel.  Newspaper Society, supra note 97; Greenslade, supra note 
87.  The current members of the IPSO board are identified on the organization’s 
website at https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/whoweare.html#Board. 
 101. See, e.g., Jason Deans, Victims of press intrusion brand new regulator 
Ipso a sham, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/sep/07/victims-press-regulator-ipso-
leveson; Roy Greenslade, Press regulation déjà vu: ‘new’ Ipso and the old PCC 
resemble each other, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/nov/04/press-regulation-
ipso; Martin Moore, New Appointments Further Increase IPSO’s Dependence on 
Powerful Industry Figures, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2014), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/martin-moore/ipso_b_6081726.html (describing 
representation of powerful publishers on IPSO’s funding board, the 
appointment of the Editor of the Daily Mail as Chair of the Editors’ Code of 
Practice Committee, the establishment of a new newspaper industry lobbying 
group, and the structural limitations on IPSO’s independence, as characterized 
by the Media Standards Trust, an organization with ties to Hacked Off). 
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the major publishers, and to the role of IPSO’s funding 
board—the Regulatory Funding Company (RFC)—in 
approving key decisions.102  Hacked Off is continuing its 
campaign against the IPSO regime.103 
IPSO need not—and reportedly will not—seek 
certification from the Royal Charter’s recognition body.104  It 
is unclear if IPSO would achieve official recognition even if it 
were to do so.105  In theory, this would leave publishers open 
to threat of exemplary damages in libel and other media-
related actions under the Crime and Courts Act 2013.  But, 
pursuant to statute, those provisions become effective only 
upon the establishment of a recognized self-regulatory 
body.106  If IPSO is the only regulatory alternative, then 
 
 102. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 101. 
 103. See, e.g., Brian Cathcart, ‘New press regulator will result in more false 
stories that victimise the weak’, THE GUARDIAN (May 31, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/may/31/press-regulation-ipso-
newspapers-media; Jamie Doward, Hacked Off says new press regulation body is 
a stitch-up, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/apr/27/hacked-off-press-regulation-
body-stitch-up-claim; Roy Greenslade, Hacked Off letter to Ipso chairman 
attacks former Sun ombudsman, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/sep/08/press-regulation-
hacked-off-campaign. 
 104. Lisa O’Carroll & Josh Halliday, Press still plans self-regulation despite 
ministers’ rejection, says Times editor, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2013), available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/09/press-plans-self-regulation-
despite-ministers-rejection-times-editor. 
 105. On the one hand, newspaper publishers have consistently claimed that 
IPSO is structured to be Leveson-compliant.  See, e.g., Michael Seamark, Tough 
new Press watchdog set up in wake of Leveson Inquiry prepares for launch 
within months, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2414732/Tough-new-Press-watchdog-
set-wake-Leveson-Inquiry-prepares-launch-months.html.  On the other hand, 
the IPSO structure has been criticized as a rebranding of the PCC, and non-
compliant with a significant number of the Leveson Report’s recommendations.  
See, e.g., Roy Greenslade, Ipso, the new press regulator, is just the PCC with 
extra bells and whistles, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jan/08/ipso-press-regulator-pcc-bells-
whistles; MEDIA STANDARDS TRUST, IPSO: AN ASSESSMENT BY THE MEDIA 
STANDARDS TRUST (Nov. 15, 2013), available at 
http://mediastandardstrust.org/mst-news/ipso-an-assessment-by-the-media-
standards-trust/; see also Greenslade, supra note 86. 
 106. The Crime and Courts Act 2013 received Royal Assent on April 13, 2013.  
Section 34 of the Act addresses exemplary damages and defines “relevant 
publisher,” section 40 relates to costs, and section 42 provides that the 
provisions would only apply if a regulator had been recognized by the 
recognition body established by Royal Charter.  Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c. 
22, pt. 2, §§ 34, 42 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/contents/enacted. 
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oversight of the press is likely to be at a standstill.  
Consequently, an important question for IPSO’s future will be 
its effectiveness at forestalling other self-regulatory 
organizations from forming and seeking recognition body 
certification. 
Enter IMPRESS, the Independent Monitor for the Press, 
launched in December 2013 as a “credible, compliant, 
independent regulator.”107  IMPRESS, whose asserted goal is 
the development of a Leveson-compliant self-regulator “truly 
independent of newspaper owners and politicians,” has been 
endorsed by the National Union of Journalists108 and 
attracted the support of former Times editor Sir Harold 
Evans.109  Although IMPRESS has apparently obtained some 
funding from the Joseph Rountree Foundation and some 
public donations, no major publishers are reported to have 
joined the initiative.110  IMPRESS could emerge as a viable 
self-regulator if it attracted the remaining unaligned 
newspapers (such as The Guardian, The Independent, and the 
Financial Times), as well as small publishers and online news 
purveyors.111  If IMPRESS sought Royal Charter certification, 
 
 107. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 18.  See also Roy 
Greenslade, Impress, the would-be alternative press regulator, appoints 
chairman, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/nov/05/press-regulation-
newspapers; IMPRESS PROJECT, IMPRESS moves another step closer to launch 
(June 30, 2014), available at http://impressproject.org/2014/06/30/impress-
moves-another-step-closer-to-launch/.  The IMPRESS Project was formed in 
2013 by Jonathan Heawood, a former director of English PEN.  See Roy 
Greenslade, Impress, a potential alternative to Ipso, takes a step towards 
formation, THE GUARDIAN (June 30, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jun/30/press-regulation-
ipso; THE GUARDIAN, Jonathan Heawood, 
http://www.theguardian.com/profile/jonathanheawood (last visited Jan. 13, 
2015) (describing Heawood); Jonathan Heawood, Why the Impress Project wants 
to talk about press regulation, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/08/impress-project-press-
regulation-ipso. 
 108. Heawood, supra note 107; Greenslade, supra note 86. 
 109. IMPRESS PROJECT, The IMPRESS Project Board, 
http://impressproject.org (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). 
 110. Greenslade, supra note 86; Roy Greenslade, Impress versus Ipso - get 
ready for another press regulation battle, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2013), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2013/dec/12/press-
regulation-hacked-off-campaign; IMPRESS PROJECT, Prospectus, 
http://impressproject.org/prospectus/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2015). 
 111. See, e.g., Greenslade, supra note 110.  Cf. Martin Moore, The topsy-turvy 
world of newspaper regulation and government spies, NEW STATESMEN (Nov. 25, 
2013), available at 
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it would trigger the exemplary damages provisions of the 
Crime and Courts Act.  Thus, like David slaying Goliath, 
IMPRESS could derail the newspaper industry’s attempt to 
freeze the Royal Charter’s review process.112  Recently, and in 
light of such an eventuality, the free speech and literature 
charity English PEN released a report warning that the 
Crimes and Courts Act legislation would have a significant 
chilling effect on freedom of expression.113 
Against that background, members of the U.K. 
government have attempted to pressure newspapers to 
comply with the Royal Charter system, and constraints on 
press access to information have begun to be put into place.114  
 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/11/topsy%E2%80%93turvy-world-
newspaper-regulation-and-government-spies (making a similar point in the 
context of an argument rejecting the amenability of the Royal Charter to 
manipulation by politicians). 
 112. Some have wondered whether that might be one of the rationales for the 
introduction of IMPRESS.  Both Hacked Off representatives and Heawood have 
denied that IMPRESS “was some kind of front organization for Hacked Off.”  
Greenslade, supra note 110.  Nevertheless, “it is obvious that Impress does 
amount to a stalking horse for Hacked Off . . . .”  Id. 
 113. HELEN ANTHONY, WHO JOINS THE REGULATOR? A REPORT ON THE 
IMPACT OF THE CRIME AND COURTS ACT ON PUBLISHERS 3, ENGLISH PEN (Nov. 
2014), available at http://www.englishpen.org/campaigns/who-joins-the-
regulator/ (“ English PEN is concerned that the lack of consultation and 
parliamentary debate surrounding the legislation and the Royal Charter has 
resulted in a confused, contradictory and arbitrary series of definitions [of 
‘relevant publisher’  under the legislation] and exemptions that will create 
uncertainty and chill freedom of expression.”). 
 114. For example, Prime Minister David Cameron warned the press in a 
speech that faced “hideous” statutory regulation if it chose not to participate in 
the Royal Charter process.  See Watt, supra note 9.  Cameron is not alone.  
Numerous members of the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Select 
Committee “generated some heat” during a hearing in which they questioned 
Lord Hunt, the present PCC Chair and proponent of IPSO.  Greenslade, supra 
note 86; Roy Greenslade, Hunt of the PCC sweats under fire from the Commons 
Charterists, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jan/29/press-regulation-
lord-hunt. Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg has publicly predicted high fines 
for non-compliant newspapers.  Rowena Mason & Andrew Sparrow, Press self-
regulation without oversight may lead to higher fines, hints Clegg, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/oct/06/press-self-regulation-higher-
fines-ipso-clegg (“I think we should let this system run for a bit because these 
incentives will increase over time.  So let’s just give it a bit of time.”).  The Daily 
Mail Editor recently appealed for press unity in response, inter alia, to 
“suggestions from some politicians that they will ‘finish what they began with 
Leveson’ after the general election.”  Press Association, Daily Mail editor: unite 
to fight for press freedom, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/oct/28/daily-mail-editor-press-freedom-
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Should there be another tabloid debacle before the general 
elections of 2015—and especially after the expenditure of 
millions of pounds on the Leveson Inquiry—public opinion 
might well force candidates to push for even more drastic 
regulation.115 
In sum, the future of the Leveson Report’s 
recommendations for press reform in the U.K. is currently 
unsettled.  Despite characterizations of British press reform 
as at an impasse,116 what seems certain is that something will 
be done.117 
 
paul-dacre-ripa-eu  [hereinafter Press Association].  The Information 
Commissioner’s Office released a draft for consultation.  INFORMATION 
COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE, DATA PROTECTION AND JOURNALISM: A GUIDE FOR 
THE MEDIA (2014), available at https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1552/data-protection-and-journalism-media-
guidance.pdf.  Post-Leveson, U.K. police have been less forthcoming in naming 
suspects and arrests.  Roy Greenslade, Rolf Harris: Mail and Sun blame 
Leveson inquiry for his ‘secret’ arrest, THE GUARDIAN (July 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jul/01/ukcrime-national-
newspapers (describing resulting chilling effect).  The Government has also 
begun consultations on press access restrictions in the context of data protection 
and police relationships.  See Peter Preston, Stephen Lawrence saga shows we 
still need whistleblowers, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/mar/09/stephen-lawrence-saga-
whistleblowers-undercover-policing-mail-guardian (“Now, after Leveson, police 
channels of information are closed.”); Roy Greenslade, Journalists face 
‘fundamental threat to freedom of expression’, says lawyer, THE GUARDIAN (July 
8, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jul/08/data-protection-
privacy (on new data-handling guidance now under consideration by the 
Information Commissioner’s Office); Owen Bowcott, Secret hearings could allow 
police to seize journalists’ notes if bill passes, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 31, 2014), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jan/31/secret-hearings-
police-journalists-deregulation-bill; Roy Greenslade, David Cameron urged not 
to water down the freedom of information act, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2013), 
available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2013/oct/30/freedomofinformatio
n-davidcameron; Roy Greenslade, Publishers fear threat to press freedom in new 
criminal justice bill, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jun/05/press-freedom-
medialaw.  But see Owen Bowcott, Government drops plan to give attorney 
general power over web news archives, THE GUARDIAN (June 30, 2014), available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jun/30/attorney-general-online-
news-archives; Roy Greenslade, Supreme court ruling opens door to revelations 
of secret information, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/mar/27/medialaw-thetimes. 
 115. Cf. infra note 168. 
 116. See, e.g., WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 10. 
 117. On the one hand, delay could arguably work in the newspapers’ favor.  
See Damian Tambini, It’s 2014 and We’re Still Implementing Leveson Inquiry 
Recommendations, LSE MEDIA POLICY PROJECT (Jan. 8, 2014), available at 
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II. “A GRAVE ERROR”?:118 WORRISOME ASPECTS OF THE 
LEVESON UNDERTAKING 
The Leveson approach to press regulation has been 
characterized by many proponents as a moderate and 
proportional response to the unsavory realities of the tabloid 
press.119  What at first glance might be modest and sensible, 
however, is likely to have broad-ranging negative 
consequences both for the British press and journalism 
worldwide.120  Without disputing that the British tabloid 
press went too far in phone-hacking, blagging, and the rest of 
the newsgathering “dark arts,” often violating existing law, 
Leveson-based press regulation in Britain is likely to be 
overly intrusive on the work of the press in the new media 
age.121  It is possible to address unlawful actions by the press 
 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2014/01/08/its-2014-and-were-still-
implementing-leveson-inquiry-recommendations/ (“The closer the 2015 
elections, the more the power balance shifts to the editors and owners.  They 
may be tempted to tough it out, even when the costs threat is a real one.”).  On 
the other hand, companies accountable to shareholders and concerned about 
public opinion may “weigh risks . . . more prudently.”  Id.  And politicians would 
find it very difficult to back off from Leveson after the expenditure of extensive 
resources on the inquiry.  Levi, supra note 6; Tambini, supra (“Whilst it is finely 
balanced, no front bench politician, and least of all the Prime Minister, will 
want to go into an election year with nothing at all to show for the Inquiry.  The 
total direct cost of the Leveson Inquiry was £5 442 400.  This is likely to be a 
fraction of the total cost of the inquiry, which heard evidence from 737 
witnesses from government, media companies, the police and all sectors of 
society.  Many witnesses had senior legal and PR advice and representation, 
much of the cost of which will have been borne by the public purse.  And that 
leaves out the lost productivity caused as the Inquiry was streamed into homes 
and offices up and down the land.”). 
 118. The outgoing head of Ofcom, the regulator and competition authority for 
the U.K.’s electronic communications industries, has publicly called any form of 
statutory regulation of the press “a grave error.”  See James Slack, Grave error 
to gag the media, says head of Ofcom: Idea of statutory regulation leaves her 
feeling ‘very nervous’, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 2, 2014), available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2571758/Grave-error-gag-media-says-
head-Ofcom-Idea-statutory-regulation-leaves-feeling-nervous.html (quoting 
Colette Bowe, who also reported at the Oxford Media Convention that she was 
“very, very nervous about any form of regulation near our press.”). 
 119. This Article focuses principally on the Leveson Report’s 
recommendations because the Royal Charter incorporates twenty-three of them. 
 120. See infra pt. II, § E.  See also WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 
4. 
 121. As The Guardian’s chief legal officer concluded: “What Leveson has 
come up with is the worst of all worlds.  His attempt to please everybody and 
avoid being a dusty footnote on a shelf somewhere has led him down a road that 
has proved to be pretty disastrous.”  Gavriel Hollander, Leveson has been 
‘disastrous’ says Guardian legal chief, PRESS GAZETTE (Sep. 18, 2013), available 
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directly without effectively creating a new regime of press 
licensing.  Although the phone-hacking scandal served as the 
trigger for the much broader regulatory debate, the two 
should not be conflated.122  And press regulation under the 
Royal Charter cannot be addressed separately from the 
British government’s unprecedented attempts to intimidate 
national security reporting. 
A. “Voluntary Self-Regulation” or “Licensing By Proxy?” 
Even though press reform efforts in the U.K. are not 
hampered by constitutional provisions such as the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution (under which 
the Leveson option would fail in the United States), there 
appears to be a British consensus that press licensing or 
direct regulation of the press would not be acceptable.123  So 
the Royal Charter approach is self-consciously designed to 
avoid state licensing and explicit government oversight of 
journalistic content.  Its proponents argue that press freedom 
is adequately protected under the regime because 
subscription to the self-regulatory body is voluntary, because 
the Royal Charter cannot be amended without a super-
majority vote,124 and because the press regulator would exist 
 
at http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/leveson-has-been-disastrous-says-guardian-
legal-chief.  The approach is overly press-restrictive even in light of the British 
press/privacy calculus, which is different from the calculus in the United States.  
See infra note 158. 
 122. See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 18. 
 123. It is well to be reminded that different countries weigh the relative 
importance of free press and reputational values differently, see David A. 
Anderson, Transnational Libel, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 71, 82 (2012), and so one 
should not unthinkingly apply American free speech norms to the British 
question.  This Article argues that it is far from clear whether Lord Justice 
Leveson’s complex solution in fact reflects the British balance.  Even though the 
U.K. does not have constitutional press protection, it is a signatory to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which protects press freedom under 
Article 10.  For an initial discussion of British press reform from the vantage 
point of Article 10, see infra note 203. 
 124. The Royal Charter is said to be cloistered from political interference 
because it can only be amended by a two-thirds supermajority vote in both 
Houses of Parliament.  Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, c. 24, pt. 6, 
§ 96 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/2 
4/part/6/crossheading/royal-charters/enacted. Proponents assert that “[t]he 
Charter insulates the press from political interference to a degree not seen 
before.”  Brian Cathcart, Why the big newspaper groups hate the Royal Charter, 
INFORRM’S BLOG (Oct. 25, 2013), available at 
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2013/10/25/why-the-big-newspaper-groups-hate-
the-royal-charter-brian-cathcart/. 
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as a private entity established by the newspapers 
themselves.125  Accordingly, the initial question is whether—
by making participation voluntary and state involvement 
indirect—the Leveson approach can side-step the harms of 
press licensing and direct state oversight.126 
A major stumbling block is that the regime will not be 
truly voluntary in practice.  Because the system is unlikely to 
work without the participation of the major players in the 
newspaper industry, it is structured to create significant 
pressures to participate.  Small publishers with slender 
purses would obviously perceive those pressures as directly 
coercive, but they are not alone.  Large, well-heeled 
publishers as well would likely feel compelled to join a 
certified regulator lest they be inundated with multi-million 
dollar lawsuits—with the possibility of high exemplary 
damages and costs obligations—for media torts.127  Moreover, 
government officials have threatened statutory press 
regulation if the press does not accept the Leveson-inspired 
approach.128  Realistically, then, newspapers will be 
compelled to join a certified regulator, if one is established.129 
Once they submit themselves to the authority of the self-
regulatory body, the newspapers will be vulnerable to “proxy 
licensing once removed”—where a government-established 
entity will have the discretion to refuse certification or re-
 
 125. That a self-regulatory entity is to be subject to oversight by a 
government-appointed body is not, as such, rare in the United Kingdom (and 
Europe), where co-regulation is not unusual in other industries. 
 126. In the United States, the press is seen as a special, and constitutionally 
protected business.  See generally C. Edwin Baker, The Independent 
Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 
(2007). 
 127. The history of high defamation awards in Britain would no doubt figure 
in their deliberations on the question.  Libel reform under the Defamation Act, 
2013 is not likely to reduce significantly those papers’ concerns about extensive 
financial exposure in both defamation and privacy-related cases. 
 128. See Nicholas Watt & Josh Halliday, Maria Miller tells press: agree to 
charter or face worse, THE GUARDIAN (Oct 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/11/maria-miller-warning-press-
charter-regulation (The government has given the newspaper industry a 
warning “that it risks being subject to full statutory regulation if it refuses to 
accept the royal charter.”); see also supra note 9 (referring to David Cameron’s 
invocation of “hideous” statutory regulation absent press compliance with Royal 
Charter). 
 129. They would be subject to the sanctions imposed over their practices by 
the regulator.  And whatever the sanction, any news organization that did not 
comply with the regulator’s ruling would potentially be subject to having the 
regulator’s finding used in a private lawsuit. 
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certification of a “voluntary” self-regulatory entity as an 
approved regulator if it is not deemed to satisfy the 
recognition body’s substantive and procedural criteria.  
Notably, much like a licensing scheme, the Royal Charter 
Recognition Panel will engage in both cyclical and ad hoc 
reviews of whether the recognized press Regulator is 
continuing to meet the Royal Charter’s Leveson-based 
recognition criteria.130 
Arguably, this is tantamount to statutory regulation at a 
remove—where the government will use private parties to 
achieve its aims indirectly.  Even though the recognition body 
will not directly run the operations of the self-regulatory 
entity, its oversight and monitoring roles under the Charter 
will inevitably create incentives for self-regulation—at two 
levels—in harmony with the substantive standards approved 
by the government-established body.  We can expect the self-
regulatory body to regulate with a view to satisfying the 
explicit or tacit requirements of its certifying entity.  And, in 
turn, the newspaper members of the press self-regulator 
would have significant incentives to self-censor so as to avoid 
extensive potential sanctions from their self-regulatory body. 
Assurances that the press regulator would not have the 
power to prevent publication cannot gainsay these layers of 
likely self-censorship.131  So the Royal Charter, by holding the 
press’ self-regulatory entity hostage to the cyclical and ad hoc 
review power of the recognition body, could well achieve 
results akin to licensing indirectly, without formally 
accrediting the press.  Only two degrees of separation would 
exist between the government and the operations of 
particular newspapers. 
The ongoing certification requirement and the 
Recognition Body’s ad hoc review authority mean that 
newspapers will continuously operate under the threat of 
 
 130. Under the Royal Charter, the self-regulatory body is subject not only to 
cyclical reviews by the recognition body according to a statutory schedule (in 
order to assure that it continues to satisfy the twenty-three recognition criteria 
established in the Charter), but also to ad hoc reviews whenever the board of 
the recognition panel thinks it is in the public interest.  The recognition factors 
are grounded on the Leveson Report’s recommendations.  Royal Charter, supra 
note 60, ¶ 10.  The board’s ad hoc review power is triggered if it thinks that 
there are “exceptional circumstances” calling for ad hoc review, including 
“serious breaches of the recognition criteria.”  Id. at ¶ 8. 
 131. See LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7; Royal Charter, supra note 60, 
sched. 3, ¶ 17. 
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compelled self-justification.  In addition, the very numerosity 
of the Leveson-based criteria to be assessed by the 
Recognition body gives the body extensive discretion.  The 
discretion to hold the regulator hostage to any one of twenty-
three different recognition requirements virtually ensures 
that the Recognition body could find some element of non-
compliance if it wished to do so.132  Moreover, the regime will 
likely lead to one or a few self-regulatory bodies seeking 
certification.  In the absence of greater competition among 
such bodies, the Recognition body could more easily funnel 
standardizing norms through its relicensing process. 
Because of their threats to press freedom, hybrid models 
of self-regulation or meta-regulation used in Britain in other 
contexts should not be applied in the press context.133 
B. State Insulation or “Crossing the Rubicon?”134 
Proponents of indirect press regulation argue that the 
regulatory structure was precisely designed to insulate the 
press’ regulator from politics and government.  Yet Charter 
opponents argue that this is not enough—either in principle 
or in practice. 
First, opponents claim that even though the Royal 
Charter is not the direct equivalent of full state press control, 
any form of state input—including a Royal Charter initially 
crafted to insulate press regulation from state control—would 
still have crossed “the psychological barrier to state action.”135  
Whether directly through the “front door of Westminster” or 
 
 132. Royal Charter, supra note 60, sched. 3. 
 133. See Adam Tucker, Press Regulation and the Royal Prerogative (Nov. 8, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2347375 
(categorizing the Royal Charter as meta-regulation).  For discussion of meta-
regulation (audited self-regulation), see, for example, Cary Coglianese & Evan 
Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation, in THE OXFORD BOOK OF 
REGULATION (Robert Baldwin et al eds., 2010). 
 134. Patrick Wintour & Dan Sabbagh, Leveson report: David Cameron refuses 
to ‘cross Rubicon’ and write press law, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 29, 2012, available 
at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/nov/29/david-cameron-refuses-to-
write-press-law (quoting Prime Minister David Cameron’s description of 
statutory press regulation). 
 135. Jacob Rowbottom, Leveson, press freedom and the watchdogs, RENEWAL, 
vol. 21, no. 1 (Apr. 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.renewal.org.uk/articles/leveson-press-freedom-and-the-watchdogs/; 
WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 13.  For an argument that the 
Royal Charter approach is an ultra vires exercise of prerogative power, see 
Tucker, supra note 133. 
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“the back door of Buckingham Palace[,]” the Royal Charter 
system has “introduced an element of political influence—no 
matter how distant—into the control of the press.”136  For 
those who are principally concerned about protecting the 
press against state power, direct and indirect regulations are 
both unpalatable. 
Critics of Leveson and the Royal Charter also question 
the effectiveness of the effort to insulate the Royal Charter 
process from Parliamentary or executive end-run.  This is 
because, they claim, the super-majority amendment 
requirement does not necessarily eliminate pressure on the 
press to self-censor.137  Depending on circumstances, cobbling 
together political supermajorities to change the Royal 
Charter is not inconceivable.138 
Although the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
provision is designed as a “protection ‘lock’”139 against passing 
more stringent press regulation, it in fact opens the door to 
statutory controls that did not exist previously.140  If another 
press scandal akin to the phone hacking scandal comes to 
light, or if investigative reporting on Parliament cuts too close 
to the bone, and if members of Parliament feel public 
pressure to muzzle the press, then we can anticipate across-
the-aisle political agreements that might head toward 
supermajority amendment.141  At a minimum, the recognition 
 
 136. Editorial, Media regulation: a royal seal, with no deal, THE GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 28, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/28/media-regulation-royal-
charter-press.  The Guardian editorial makes clear that because the Privy 
Council consists of ministers from the “government of the day,” the Royal 
Charter option simply replaces one set of political influences (Parliament) with 
another (Ministers). 
 137. See infra pt. II, § D. 
 138. See Telegraph View, The fight goes on for press freedom, TELEGRAPH 
(Oct. 30, 2013), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-
view/10415103/The-fight-goes-on-forpress-freedom.html (“Such a scenario is not 
unimaginable.  The Guardian’s recent investigation into state spying is exactly 
the kind of reporting that could spark a moral panic among politicians and give 
them cause to limit what the press can publish.  If Parliament can find the 
numbers to impose a royal charter upon the industry, it can also find the 
numbers necessary to censor it.”). 
 139. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 15. 
 140. Id.  So long as Parliament had a two-thirds majority, it could “vote for 
stronger controls over regulation.”  Id. 
 141. The Sunday Times wrote about the two-thirds majority provision that 
“[i]t is in fact an open invitation to future politicians to restrain the press from 
exposing the secrets of the powerful.  It is easy to imagine such a majority being 
constructed in the grip of a moral panic.  Anyone who thinks the press is 
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body created under the auspices of the Royal Charter may 
fear such developments and therefore have an incentive to 
regulate in order to avoid them.  In addition, clever ways to 
avoid the limits have already been imagined.142  Press 
organizations seeking change in the Royal Charter regime 
would be constrained to lobby a two-thirds Parliamentary 
majority to do so, while a future Government seeking to 
eliminate the super-majority requirement might simply 
repeal the legislation by majority vote.143  Moreover, as some 
have argued, the super-majority requirement might undercut 
its own goals.144 
 
overreacting should consider blatant attempts made by government aides last 
year to intimidate The Daily Telegraph over its investigation into the expenses 
of Maria Miller, the Culture Secretary.”  WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra 
note 4, at 15 (quoting editorial). 
 142. In addition, the two-thirds Parliamentary vote requirement for Charter 
amendment might be evaded precisely because royal charters are capable of 
being issued by the monarch, on the Prime Minister’s advice, without reference 
to Parliament.  Thus, it is possible that the monarch could issue an entirely new 
charter regulating the press, so long as it does not purport to amend the 
previous one subject to the supermajority amendment requirement.  See Jacob 
Rees-Mogg, Royal charter: The press must resist this assault on liberty, 
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/leveson-inquiry/9954913/Royal-
charter-The-press-must-resist-this-assault-on-liberty.html.  For another 
argument that proceeding with press regulation by Royal Charter, even if it 
protected against subsequent amendment by the executive, would still permit 
legislative overriding, see Rowbottom, supra note 135.  There is also a 
reasonable argument that the operations of a press regulatory system under 
Royal Charter would also be less transparent than if accomplished via statute.  
Id. 
 143. See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 15–16.  Might Section 
96 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013 itself be amended by a 
majority Parliamentary vote, even if the Parliamentary two-thirds vote 
requirement in the Royal Charter cannot be?  See Andrew Gilligan, Royal 
charter: The men who want to kill our free press, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 24, 2013), 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/9949855/Royal-charter-The-
men-who-want-to-kill-our-free-press.html. 
 144. The press regulation Royal Charter is likely to need amendment over 
time, as the media landscape changes.  Because such amendment will require 
political super-majorities across party lines, the need for super-majorities might 
“forc[e] the press into the kind of give-and-take relationship with politicians so 
familiar in the statute-regulated world of broadcasting.”  Steve Hewlett, Could 
the royal charter force the press into political haggling?, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 
10, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/media-
blog/2013/nov/10/press-regulation-royal-charter. Other Royal Charter opponents 
have worried that the supermajority requirement could potentially protect a 
regulator hostile to the press from being removed.  See Rees-Mogg, supra note 
142 (“The ultimate person in charge of the recognition body’s members is the 
Commissioner for Public Appointments.  The Crown selects him, so it is 
conceivable that a government could appoint someone hostile to the press in an 
354 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 55 
C. Shifting Power 
Proponents of statutory press regulation have argued 
that journalism and the public interest need protection 
against the power of private entities, including powerful 
newspaper publishers.  Some ground their position on the 
central role played by Rupert Murdoch and his News of the 
World newspaper both in the phone-hacking scandal, and—
and more importantly—in the British political environment 
since the Thatcher days.145  Revelations of former Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s role in advising former News of the 
World Editor Rebekah Brooks add to the concerns about 
improper closeness of press barons and politicians.146  To the 
extent that regulation would undermine that kind of outside 
political influence, it would arguably be democracy-
enhancing. 
However, the time for the moderate version of the 
watchdog role is long gone.  Whatever one might say about 
the balance between government and corporate—indeed, 
press—power in the late twentieth century, it is significantly 
 
effort to stiffen control.  It would then be harder for a successor government to 
restore press freedom.”). 
 145. It is true that the Leveson Report characterizes the problem as part of 
the shared journalistic culture in British newspapers, and admittedly criminal 
investigations are now revealing phone hacking and other law-violating activity 
by tabloids other than NEWS OF THE WORLD.  But it is not inconceivable that 
the Murdoch organization was a prime mover whose activities then lead to a 
snowballing effect as a result of competition.  Many in Britain believe that the 
popular press—especially the Murdoch papers—“has had an improper armlock 
on the political class—both Labour and Conservative.”  See John Lloyd, The 
Two Cultures, in MEDIA AND PUBLIC SHAMING: DRAWING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
DISCLOSURE 218 (Julian Petley ed., 2013).  While Murdoch has antecedents in 
Britain’s famously powerful press barons of the early twentieth century, he 
succeeded in turning News Corporation from an ordinary news company into a 
global conglomerate using its press capabilities as a way of seeking influence.  
Jay Rosen, Phone hacking crisis shows News Corp is no ordinary news company, 
THE GUARDIAN (July 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jul/19/rupert-
murdoch-phone-hacking.  The Leveson Inquiry itself uncovered significantly 
cozy relationships between Murdoch, his NEWS OF THE WORLD editors, and the 
British Government.  For a recent example, former NEWS OF THE WORLD editor 
Andy Coulson served as the communications director for David Cameron.  
Burns, supra note 5.  British media analysts conclude that “[i]f the political 
class is or was to a significant extent in thrall to the Murdoch press, that is 
clearly a reason for real concern.”  Lloyd, supra, at 219. 
 146. See, e.g., Lisa O’Carroll, Tony Blair advised Rebekah Brooks on phone-
hacking scandal, court hears, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/feb/19/tony-blair-rebekah-brooks-
phone-hacking. 
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different today.  Looking to government—or to government 
hand-in-hand with nominally private parties—to curb private 
press power is a mistaken strategy both because of the 
diminution of private press power, and because of the 
increasing threat of government power (and government 
power wielded in collusion with private power) over free 
speech today. 
1. The Murdoch Factor 
With respect to the Murdoch factor, it does not deny 
Murdoch’s past influence to note that Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s “feral beasts” are now mostly notable for their “ebbing 
power.”147  Politicians have myriad ways to reach the voting 
public directly, circulation figures even for the national 
papers are down dramatically, and the press itself is 
reporting that the newspapers’ grip on the national political 
debate is slipping.148  Murdoch himself has been a 
beleaguered figure since the News of the World scandal.149  
 
 147. THE ECONOMIST, Twilight of the scribblers? Fleet Street’s diminishing 
power underlies the fight over press regulation (Oct. 12, 2013), available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21587801-fleet-streets-diminishing-
power-underlies-fight-over-press-regulation-twilight.  See also Bernhold & 
Cowell, supra note 7 (quoting John Lloyd, co-founder of the Reuters Institute for 
the Study of Journalism at Oxford, for the proposition that the tabloids “are 
losing power all the time.”). 
 148. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 147. 
 149. According to a recent report, Scotland Yard intends to question Murdoch 
“under caution” about crime at his newspapers.  Nick Davies, Rupert Murdoch: 
Scotland Yard want interview about crime at his UK papers, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 24, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2014/jun/24/scotland-yard-want-interview-rupert-murdoch-phone-hacking.  
There has also been talk about American prosecution of News Corp. for 
violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on the grounds of NEWS OF THE 
WORLD’s police bribery practices.  See Ravi Somaiya, After 7 Years, No End in 
Sight to Phone Hacking Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/17/world/europe/no-end-in-sight-to-inquiry-
into-murdochs-media-empire.html.  Indeed, a campaign to push for such 
prosecution seems to be the raison d’etre of http://www.prosecutenewscorp.com/.  
News Corp. has been split into two, separating the news and entertainment 
parts of the company.  Amy Chozick, Shareholders Approve Plan to Split News 
Corp., N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/business/media/shareholders-approve-plan-
to-split-news-corp.html?ref=rupertmurdoch.  Huge numbers of civil suits have 
been brought over phone hacking.  See Ravi Somaiya, News Corp. Slowly 
Putting Phone-Hacking Scandal Behind It, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/business/media/news-corp-
slowly-putting-phone-hacking-scandal-behind-it.html?_r=0 (noting that News 
Corp. has settled 718 claims related to phone-hacking).  Even activist 
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Query whether Leveson’s implicit focus on Murdoch as the 
raison d’etre for an unethical British press culture is an 
example of misplaced focus in the modern press context.150  
The market conditions that permitted the twentieth century 
press barons and Murdoch’s News Corporation to accumulate 
vast power are fast fading.  Moreover, without Murdoch, the 
state of the remaining British newspaper press is unlikely to 
lead to the same kind of influence.  Given that much of the 
press power decried by regulation proponents came from the 
mutually reinforcing relationships of the press titans with 
politicians, reductions in the salience of the press inevitably 
shift the balance of power between those two groups.151 
 
shareholders sued the News Corp. board for violations of fiduciary duty in 
permitting Murdoch to run the company like a fiefdom, withdrawing the suit in 
exchange for a $139 million settlement.  Dominic Rushe & Mark Sweney, News 
Corp reaches settlement with shareholders, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2013), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/apr/22/news-corp-reaches-
settlement-shareholders.  One blog headline in THE GUARDIAN—“The Rupert 
Murdoch era is all but over”—discusses the waning power of the press in 
general and Murdoch in particular.  Steve Hewlett, The Rupert Murdoch era is 
all but over, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/media-blog/2014/jan/05/rupert-murdoch-era-
over.  Cf. Peter Preston, Once humbled, but now risen: the Murdochs march 
ahead, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jun/29/rupert-murdoch-humbled-now-
march-ahead (noting that “Murdoch certainly has his swagger back, if not his 
reputation and influence.”); Somayia, News Corp. Slowly Putting Phone-
Hacking Scandal Behind It, supra (noting financial benefit of News Corporation 
split). 
 150. Even if that is too optimistic an assessment, neither the Murdoch 
phenomenon nor the sensationalist character of the tabloids suffices to justify 
the multi-layered structure of press reform envisioned in the Leveson Report.  
To the extent that the U.K. press problem is attributable to the influence-
seeking behavior of the Murdoch organization and its malign influence 
elsewhere in the media sector, then query whether other ownership limits, for 
example, might serve as more effective and targeted solutions than the Leveson 
Inquiry’s preferred bureaucratic structures?  Media ownership rules could 
potentially offer an alternative more sensitive to press values. 
 151. It might be argued that the diminishing economic security of the press 
will lead to increased misbehavior, thereby justifying regulation.  Arguably, 
phone-hacking itself resulted from ruthless competition in an industry that is 
both democratically necessary and financially in free-fall.  See generally Tim 
Luckhurst, Missing the Target and Spurning the Prize in THE PHONE HACKING 
SCANDAL: JOURNALISM ON TRIAL (Richard Lance Keeble & John Mair, eds. 
2012) (arguing against press regulation and contending that hacking occurred 
in a context of ruthless competition that often drove journalists to break rules); 
Cf. Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Prying, Spying and Lying: Media Intrusions and What 
the Law Should Do About Them, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 179 (1998) (attributing 
increases in media intrusions to competition). But the misbehavior could be 
controlled through means other than overarching attempts to promote 
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2. Hacked Off and Fears of Increased Media 
Irresponsibility 
Proponents of the Leveson-recommended independent 
regulatory structure argue that, whatever its hypothetical 
dangers, it is preferable to the alternative: publishers whose 
economic incentives to sensationalize coverage and cut 
corners will inevitably undermine truly voluntary self-
regulation.152  Admittedly, reduced resources, fierce 
competition, and the 24-hour news cycle have already led 
many news purveyors down the path to sensational, 
overwrought, inaccurate, acontextual, and “he said-she said” 
reporting.153  Victim groups such as Hacked Off predict 
continuous declines in press ethics in the absence of effective 
regulation.154  Critics worry that things will only deteriorate, 
as participants in the digital Fourth Estate do not all 
necessarily share the professional journalistic norms and 
practices of the traditional, high-brow institutional press of 
the twentieth century.155  On this view, moderate press 
regulation such as the Leveson approach, while perhaps 
inconsistent with a strong version of the watchdog 
 
“voluntary” regulation.  Moreover, query whether the diversity of press outlets 
in the digital Fourth Estate, even enabling misbehavior, could also enhance 
accountability? 
 152. See, e.g., Rowbottom, supra note 135. 
 153. Criticism of the current media and its coverage incentives is legion.  
Popular books of that stripe include HOWARD ROSENBERG & CHARLES S. 
FELDMAN, NO TIME TO THINK (2008); For critiques of  “he said she said” 
journalism (referring to reports in which journalists report polarized extremes 
on factually verifiable matters without attempting to assess truth claims), see, 
for example, Jay Rosen, He Said, She Said Journalism: Lame Formula in the 
Land of the Active User, PRESSTHINK, (Apr. 12, 2009), available at 
http://archive.pressthink.org/2009/04/12/hesaid_shesaid.html; Linda 
Greenhouse, Challenging ‘He Said, She Said’ Journalism, NEIMAN REPORTS, 
(July 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/102769/Challenging-He-Said—
She-Said-Journalism/. 
 154. Hacked Off and its supporters have pointed to what they take to be post-
Leveson press failures.  See, e.g., Greenslade, supra note 103; Brooks Newmark 
Complaint is Dropped.  So What About IPSO?, HACKED OFF, (Oct. 21, 2014), 
available at http://hackinginquiry.org/comment/brooks-newmark-complaint-is-
dropped-so-what-about-ipso/(discussing tabloid sex sting involving MPs).  See 
also Gerry McCann, Leveson Has Changed Nothing–The Media Still Put 
‘Stories’ Before The Truth, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 2, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/02/leveson-gerry-mccann-
media-stories-before-truth (critique of newspaper coverage by parent of 
disappeared toddler Madeleine McCann). 
 155. See infra, pt. F.  See also AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: 
HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE PRESS (2015). 
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justification for a free press, should be deemed consistent 
with a moderate form of the watchdog argument.156 
Predictions of further large-scale press misbehavior are 
not necessarily accurate, however.  Indeed, there may be 
aspects to the evolving media landscape that will lead to 
increased accuracy and accountability.157  Moreover, there 
may be much less intrusive ways of addressing tabloid 
excesses than an overarching regulatory system such as that 
contemplated under the Royal Charter.158 
More significantly, complaints about media excess and 
warnings of future journalistic irresponsibility are far from 
new.  What makes movements for journalistic accountability 
particularly credible and effective now, however, is the 
diminution in the power, status, and cohesion of the 
institutional press today.  The phone hacking scandal and 
other press misbehavior in fact worked to reduce the status 
and power of the press and to mobilize public opinion against 
British tabloids.  Explaining phone hacking by reference to 
the pressures created by the diminution in the press’ fortunes 
does not negate the shift in the power relationship between 
politicians and the press.  The press’ power is inevitably 
reduced as politicians both fear and need the press less.  It is 
no surprise that calls for press regulation have begun to 
gather momentum at the very moment that technology and 
economics have upended the twentieth century business 
model—and concomitant power—of traditional news 
organizations.159  Warnings about increased press 
irresponsibility serve as convenient and under-examined 
 
 156. See, e.g., Rowbottom, supra note 135 (distinguishing between strong and 
moderate versions of the watchdog justification for press freedom). 
 157. See infra, text accompanying note 281. 
 158. For example, more effective regulation of wiretapping, trespassing, 
phone hacking and other intrusive newsgathering techniques, and even the 
recognition of a privacy tort as such could constitute more balanced and tailored 
responses to journalistic misbehavior.  Ultimately, less restrictive alternatives 
are available to control the worst of the tabloids’ problematic newsgathering 
behavior.  If the Leveson Report’s only goal were to minimize violations of 
criminal law by the press, it could certainly have achieved that by far less 
editorially-intrusive means. 
 159. This proposition is by now so commonly accepted as to require no 
extensive support.  See, e.g., Leonard Downie, Jr. & Michael Schudson, The 
Reconstruction of American Journalism, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW, 
Leonard Downie, Jr. & Michael Schudson, The Reconstruction of American 
Journalism, 28 (October 19, 2009); Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 90 
N.C. L. REV. 1531, 1536–47 (2012) and sources cited therein. 
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excuses for powerful non-press actors to tether the watchdog 
press. 
3. The Surveillance State and The Guardian’s Snowden 
Woes 
The diminution in press power described above is 
accompanied by increasing use of state power to intimidate 
the press and public.  Whatever our concerns about abuse of 
private power, the reality of the era of the surveillance state 
is that protection from government (and particularly 
government in combination with private power) should have 
primary salience.160  The continuing saga of The Guardian’s 
news coverage based on NSA contractor Edward Snowden’s 
leaked national security documents serves as an object lesson 
here. 
Against the backdrop of ongoing press reform, the British 
government has been actively seeking to constrain The 
Guardian’s reporting of these materials.161  From effectively 
requiring The Guardian to destroy computer hard drives 
containing Snowden material,162 to detaining journalist Glenn 
Greenwald’s partner at Heathrow airport,163 to subjecting 
Guardian Editor Alan Rusbridger to Parliamentary 
committee testimony in which he was asked whether he loved 
Britain,164 to making public assertions that the paper’s 
reporting was definitively harming national security,165 the 
 
 160. Jack Balkin has argued that “the greatest threat to freedom of speech 
today is not simply that of public power or private power.  It is their potent 
combination.”  Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment Is An Information Policy, 
41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 28 (2012). 
 161. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 19–26. 
 162. See, e.g., Luke Harding, Footage Released Of Guardian Editors 
Destroying Snowden Hard Drives, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 31, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/31/footage-released-guardian-
editors-snowden-hard-drives-gchq. 
 163. See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, David Miranda Lawyers Argue That Heathrow 
Detention Was Unlawful, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/06/david-miranda-lawyers-
heathrow-detention-high-court. 
 164. See, e.g., Jack Mirkinson & Alan Rusbridger Got Asked Some Ridiculous 
Questions At Parliamentary Hearing, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 3, 2013), 
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/03/alan-rusbridger-
parliament-questioning-ridiculous_n_4377928.html. 
 165. See, e.g., James Slack, Guardian Has Handed A Gift To Terrorists’, 
Warns MI5 Chief: Left-Wing Paper’s Leaks Caused ‘Greatest Damage To Western 
Security In History’ Say Whitehall Insiders, DAILY MAIL, (Oct. 8, 2013), available 
at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2450237/MI5-chief-Andrew-Parke-
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U.K. government has threatened The Guardian’s political 
reporting on numerous fronts.  It has deployed the rhetoric of 
terrorism as a lever to control press coverage of national 
security matters.  The Government’s actions have been 
characterized as “an unprecedented level of political 
interference in the freedom of the press . . . .”166  They are 
doubtless calculated acts of intimidation. 
In addition to the Royal Charter regulatory regime and 
direct government censorship of national security reporting, 
press watchdogs have identified potential misuses of DA-
notices,167 journalist arrests, proposed changes to legal 
safeguards for journalistic materials, proposed Internet 
legislation, and threats to change data protection legislation 
to reduce protections for journalistic activity as additional 
concerns for press freedom in the U.K.168 
Whatever the asserted power of the press, this kind of 
coordinated and blatant state effort to censor reporting on 
government’s activities is directly threatening and far more 
worrisome than the waning power of the traditional tabloid 
press. 
Moreover, some have argued that media serve as a 
significant element in a new model of separation of powers 
that can serve to constrain executive power.169  If that is the 
case, then all the more reason to be concerned about chilling 
effects on the media (and on the leaks on which they often 
rely).  The national security state can undermine the 
 
The-Guardian-handed-gift-terrorists.html (recounting MI5 chief’s claims that 
the Guardian’s reporting helped terrorists). 
 166. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 23. 
 167. DA-Notices—Defense Advisory Notices—are official governmental 
requests to publishers and broadcasters not to publish information for reasons 
of national security.  See Frequently Asked Questions, THE DA-NOTICE SYSTEM, 
(2012), http://www.dnotice.org.uk/faqs.htm (for a UK government description of 
the notices). 
 168. Frequently Asked Questions, THE DA-NOTICE SYSTEM, (2012), 
http://www.dnotice.org.uk/faqs.htm.  Revelations last fall of police accessing 
journalists’ phones without judicial review prompted an outcry for reform of 
RIPA, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.  Patrick Wintour, 
British Police’s Use Of Ripa Powers To Snoop On Journalists To Be Reined In, 
THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 12, 2014), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/12/police-ripa-powers-journalists-
surveillance. 
 169. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE 
ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012) (arguing, inter alia, that an 
aggressive press, a watchful public and the legalization of warfare can serve in 
combination to constrain executive power). 
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effectiveness of the “stochastic mélange”170 on whose success 
the “new” separation of powers rests. 
4. A Divided Press 
Government attempts to intimidate the press need not be 
direct.  Last fall, a number of major tabloid newspapers 
joined public officials in criticizing The Guardian for its 
Snowden reporting.171  Why have rival publishers been 
critical or silent, despite “the apparent need for solidarity 
within the media fraternity”?172  Whatever its competitive 
origins, this fissure in the press ranks cannot but be read 
against the backdrop of press regulation. 
At a minimum, the papers’ positions can be said to send 
multiple messages.  The more right-leaning tabloids might 
have criticized The Guardian because of their ideological and 
substantive disagreements on national security issues with 
the left-sympathetic Guardian.173  Or they might be reluctant 
to support the newspaper responsible for breaking the phone 
hacking story.174  Or they might have seen an opportunity in 
the controversy to boost short-term readership.  But, 
regardless of ideological position, surely they recognized that 
the government’s high-handed tactics vis-à-vis their press 
colleagues endangered the press as a whole.  Editors world-
wide came to The Guardian’s defense.175  So it can be 
 
 170. Neal K. Katyal, Stochastic Constraint, 126 HARV. L. REV. 990, 991 
(2013). 
 171. For examples of articles criticizing The Guardian for its Snowden 
coverage, see, for example, Chris Blackhurst, Edward Snowden’s Secrets May 
Be Dangerous. I Would Not Have Published Them, THE INDEPENDENT, (Oct. 13, 
2013), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/edward-
snowdens-secrets-may-be-dangerous-i-would-not-have-published-them-
8877404.html; Daily Mail Comment, The Paper That Helps Britain’s Enemies, 
DAILY MAIL, (Oct. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2451557/Daily-Mail-Comment-The-
Guardian-paper-helps-Britains-enemies.html; Rod Liddle, Guardian Treason 
Helping Terrorists, THE SUN, (Oct. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/suncolumnists/rodliddle/5192001/Guardi
an-treason-is-helping-terrorists.html. 
 172. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4 at 23. 
 173. See WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4 at 23. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See, e.g., Carl Bernstein, An Open Letter From Carl Bernstein To 
Guardian Editor Alan Rusbridger, THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 3, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/dec/03/open-letter-carl-bernstein-alan-
rusbridger; Editors On The NSA Files: ‘What The Guardian Is Doing Is 
Important For Democracy’, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/10/guardian-democracy-editors. 
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surmised that these newspapers, so heavily criticized by the 
Leveson Inquiry and inclined to resist complying with the 
Royal Charter on press reform, had incentives to signal 
submission to the state with respect to issues publicly 
identified as critical by the government.176 
It would be naïve to think of these as isolated 
developments unrelated to looming press regulation and the 
alteration in power of the institutional press.  All this 
highlights the acute character of the dangers facing the press 
in performing its checking function today. 
5. The Power Impacts of Institutional Selectivity 
It is no surprise that, after the Leveson Report was 
issued, revelations of phone-hacking by a wide swath of other, 
non-press institutions—including corporations, banks, and 
lawyers—led to public outrage, press crowing, and criticism of 
Justice Leveson’s laser-like focus on the press in his Report.177  
 
 176. In the context of addressing the dangers of the Royal Charter, for 
example, THE TELEGRAPH argued that “[t]he Guardian’s recent investigation 
into state spying is exactly the kind of reporting that could spark a moral panic 
among politicians and give them cause to limit what the press can publish.”  
Telegraph View, The Fight Goes On For Press Freedom, THE TELEGRAPH, (Oct. 
30, 2013), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-
view/10415103/The-fight-goes-on-forpress-freedom.html.  On the divided UK 
press, see, for example, Kenan Malik, Britain Needs a First Amendment, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Nov. 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/09/opinion/malik-britain-needs-a-first-
amendment.html. 
  Some proponents of press regulation “a la Leveson” argue that the 
tabloids’ reactions to the Snowden reporting are a far bigger danger for press 
freedom than self-regulation pursuant to Leveson and the Royal Charter.  See, 
e.g., Martin Moore, Part 2: The Topsy-Turvy World of Newspaper Regulation 
and Government Spies, LSE MEDIA POLICY PROJECT BLOG, (Nov. 29, 2013), 
available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2013/11/29/part-2-the-
topsy-turvy-world-of-newspaper-regulation-and-government-spies/.  But this 
point does not take a bird’s eye view of the situation.  It may well be precisely 
because of the Leveson Report, the Royal Charter, and pending exemplary 
damages and costs under the Crimes and Courts Act 2013 that the tabloids 
have turned their backs so overtly on the free speech implications of The 
Guardian’s reporting on Snowden matters.  See also supra note 106.  Whatever 
their intentions, these papers’ critique of The Guardian’s national security 
coverage might be interpreted by government not only as an argument that 
broadsheets are more harmful and dangerous than the tabloids criticized by 
Leveson, but also as an offer of a subtle quid pro quo on press reform.  Their 
stance could reasonably be seen as an implicit assurance by public proclamation 
that the press is to be trusted to be docile and amenable on matters important 
to the state even if it has sometimes gone overboard in the individual privacy 
context. 
 177. See supra note 115.  Public outrage could be attributed to the revelation 
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On this view, the Leveson Report unfairly highlighted the 
press’ failures, rather than situating them in perspective, as 
merely a part of a multi-institutional failure.178  After all, the 
institutional press today is part of a complex web of 
organizations existing in a “complicated symbiosis with the 
news media.”179  The Leveson Report, although recognizing 
the involvement of the police and politicians in the phone-
hacking affair, sought principally to repair the press piece of 
the puzzle.180  It also did not address the use of “dark arts” by 
non-press private industry. 
We should hesitate to solve interpenetrating, multi-
institutional problems by regulating—or at least 
disproportionately regulating—just one of the affected 
institutions.  Each participant is compromised in such 
situations.  Singling out unethical action in only one of the 
interacting institutions (press, politicians, and police) “while 
keeping the broader agents of responsibility afloat . . . rais[es] 
fundamental questions about which ethics matter and to 
whom.”181  Attempting to improve matters by placing the 
 
that unethical behavior was more prevalent across institutions than had been 
thought to be the case.  On the press side, the revelations fueled arguments that 
the tabloids had been unfairly targeted for behavior common elsewhere.  Critics 
also focused on the revelation that Justice Leveson had apparently been 
apprised of such widespread phone-hacking in Britain but had chosen not even 
to mention it in his report focusing on the press.  Id. 
 178. See, e.g., Press Association, supra note 114 (quoting Daily Mail Editor 
Paul Dacre: “I note with some irony that Leveson had barely a word of criticism 
for the police and the politicians.  Well, if the first had done their job properly 
and the second had not so sycophantically fawned upon Murdoch, Leveson 
would never have occurred.”). 
 179. Barbie Zelizer, When Practice Is Undercut By Ethics, ETHICS OF MEDIA 
277 (Nick Couldry, Mirca Madianou & Amit Pinchevski eds. 2013). 
 180. The disclosure-focused recommendations proposed by Leveson for the 
police and politicians appear to be far less directive and onerous than those for 
the press. 
 181. Zelizer, supra note 179, at 278.  Indeed, Professor Zelizer muses, “the 
intimacy across institutions might merit as close attention as that being paid to 
the interiors of the News of the World.”  Id.  For example, the apparent cover-up 
of Serious Organised Crime Agency’s awareness of, and failure to act on, phone-
hacking by many other blue-chip British institutions practices seems to reveal 
governmental misconduct.  See, e.g., Helen Warrell & Cynthia O’Murchu, Soca 
Failed To Act On ‘Blue-Chip Hacking’, FINANCIAL TIMES, (Aug. 21, 2013), 
available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8b40feb4-09bf-11e3-ad07-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3HyF4V5WV; Tom Harper, ‘Bigger than phone hacking’ 
- Soca sat on blue-chip dirty tricks evidence for years, THE INDEPENDENT, (July 
25, 2013), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/exclusive-
bigger-than-phone-hacking—soca-sat-on-bluechip-dirty-tricks-evidence-for-
years-8730861.html.  Under those circumstances, one might wonder whether 
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principal burden on the press may ironically recalibrate the 
balance of power among the participants and reduce the 
press’ comparative institutional position as a whole, and 
therefore further erode its ability to act as a watchdog over 
other institutions.182  This is particularly the case when, 
whatever criminality and ethical excess were attributable to a 
segment of the British press, there were certainly many 
newspapers that did not participate. 
 
selectivity in focusing on the unsavory newsgathering practices of journalists 
would serve strategic interests in muzzling the press. 
  Moreover, one might question the appropriateness of targeting the press 
rather than other participants in circumstances when multi-institutional 
unethical behavior “relativize[s]” particular practices (such as paying for 
information), or naturalizes practices (such as phone hacking) that might 
otherwise have raised ethical qualms.  See Zelizer, supra note 179, at 279.  See 
also Daniel Bennet & Judith Townend, Press ‘Omerta’: How Newspapers’ 
Failure to Report the Phone Hacking Scandal Exposed the Limitations of Media 
Accountability at 149, ThE PHONE HACKING SCANDAL: JOURNALISM ON TRIAL, 
BURY ST EDMUNDS: ABRAMIS, (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000768  (describing 
news organizations’ failure to report phone hacking scandal as due partly to the 
“ cultural socialisation of a norm of behavior . . . that justified the use of the 
‘dark arts’ as a way of holding power to account in the public interest.  The 
normalization of these practices within the press corps led to their diminishing 
significance as an issue that might be deemed ‘unexpected’ and thus 
‘newsworthy.’ ”).  To the extent that enforcing criminal rules sends a signal as to 
their social importance, it should primarily be the responsibility of the police to 
send that signal.  The absence of such a signal while the behavior becomes 
increasingly common in the industry (or in business in general, as phone 
hacking seems to have become in England) is tantamount to a counter-message. 
 182. One might wonder why that might be the case.  To the contrary, 
wouldn’t a press better guided by ethical principles improve in its ability to 
ensure the accountability of other powerful institutions?  If the phone-hacking 
affair revealed a “one hand washes the other” symbiosis, then the press would 
implicitly have conspired with the police and politicians to exchange favors.  
Under those circumstances, isn’t it counter-intuitive to suggest that a self-
regulatory regime would make the press less able to be the watchdog that it had 
agreed not to be in the first place? 
  The first response to this is that not everyone in the British press 
participated in the multi-institutional failures.  Yet regulation would 
undermine their status as potential watchdogs as well.  Moreover, the text 
attempts to flag an issue of comparative power.  Participants in multi-
institutional wrong-doing presumably negotiate their exchanges of benefits from 
relatively equal, if dynamic, positions of power.  At any point, each participant 
is free to change the deal.  If political wrongdoing were obvious enough, even a 
compromised press would have incentives to reveal it.  And if press illegality 
were glaring enough, police and government would have to address it at some 
point regardless of implicit quid pro quo arrangements.  When one of the 
participants submits to licensing by the other, however, that presumptive 
equipoise in negotiating power no longer exists.  And government has the upper 
hand because the regulatory body can increase the difficulty of going after other 
institutions’ abuses of power. 
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D. Will Leveson’s Model Predictably Lead to Press Self-
Censorship? 
Lord Justice Leveson rejected concerns about the chilling 
effect of his Report’s recommendations by saying: “I simply do 
not accept that these provisions will have a chilling effect on 
free speech or press freedom . . . I reject the suggestion that it 
will cause a degeneration of the rights of the press or a 
descent into state control.”183  However, such robust 
assertions are optimistic declarations that cannot negate the 
multiple ways in which the Report’s suggestions could 
foreseeably intimidate press coverage.184 
It would be reasonable for the press to fear regulation 
because of the various incentives to regulate inherent in the 
Royal Charter approach.  The press’ “voluntary” self-
regulatory body would have a continuing desire to maintain 
its Royal Charter certification and therefore face distinct 
incentives to abide by the Recognition Body’s directly or 
indirectly expressed preferences.  It would operate in the 
shadow of Lord Justice Leveson’s decimation of the PCC. 
Stripped to its core, the Royal Charter model calls for the 
creation of a regulator uncomfortably balancing values of 
independence and professionalism, and under the continuing 
oversight of a body in whose membership the press does not 
even have any representation.  Excessively press-restrictive 
rules and increased litigation can be predicted as a result.  A 
former editor of The Guardian concludes that the Leveson 
approach is “misguided” and will inevitably lead to a chilling 
effect on reporting.185  Indeed, he asserts that some of the 
most significant investigative reporting of his Guardian 
tenure might well have been deterred if a Leveson regulatory 
regime had been in place.186 
 
 183. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, at vol. IV, pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 7.8, 1782. 
 184. Indeed, even if the press industry’s proposed charter had been accepted, 
British press reform would still pose challenges to freedom of the press.  This is 
because the phone-hacking scandal and attendant Leveson process created the 
baselines against which press reform must be measured.  Mere tinkering 
around the edges would be insufficient in such an atmosphere. 
 185. See Peter Preston, Peter Preston: ‘Leveson Sees Journalism As An 
Exercise In Providing Cases For The Courts To Examine’, PRESS GAZETTE, (Feb. 
25, 2013), available at http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/content/peter-
prestonleveson-sees-journalism-exercise-providing-cases-courts-examine. 
 186. Id. 
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1. Structural Bias: Regulator Composition Requirements 
The structure of the Recognition Panel established under 
the Royal Charter precludes participation of publishers and 
editors on the Board or staff,187 and the Royal Charter’s 
recognition criteria in turn require the majority of the board 
of an acceptable press regulator to be independent of the 
press.188  Although the Leveson Report reiterated its 
commitment to freedom of speech and press, the two levels of 
required independence from the press predictably risk unduly 
press-restrictive rules. Under this structure, the Recognition 
Panel undervalues journalistic and editorial expertise. This in 
turn is likely to influence the decisions of the recognized press 
regulator.  Whatever the journalists on the board of the 
regulator would say, the final votes to be taken by the 
regulator are likely to reflect the views of the non-press 
majorities, and their predictions of what the press-
independent Recognition Panel would think of their 
decisions.189  Finally, the structure of the standards Code 
Committee, by reducing the role of serving editors, is likely to 
lead to a less press-protective code.190 
The rationale for the Leveson Report’s recommendation—
that the decision-making members of the body be 
independent of the press—was that a non-press board would 
represent a “balanced” view of press freedom and privacy.  
However, the talismanic invocation of the notion of balance 
here is not particularly helpful.  How is such a majority-lay 
body to balance those interests, which are often 
 
 187. Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, supra note 60, at 5.2, 7.3 
& sched. 1.  That politicians are also precluded from Board membership does 
not minimize the negative effect of the press exclusion.  That the Charter 
requires every Board member to have “an understanding of the context within 
which the Regulator will operate” (id. at 3.2(a)(ii)(emphasis supplied)) is a 
requirement more anodyne than meaningful.  Moreover, since Board members 
can be terminated simply if “the Board is satisfied . . . that a Member is 
unwilling, unable or unfit to discharge” his/her functions (id. at 6.2), there is 
ample opportunity for a Board suspicious of the press to censure dissent and 
ensure lock-step. 
 188. Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, supra note 60, at sched. 
3, 3–5. 
 189. Indeed, the Report’s proposals might unintentionally cede control not 
just to the self-regulatory body, but also to press targets themselves.  With 
control tipping toward privacy, news subjects could evade journalistic attention 
simply by advising the press that they did not wish to be covered. 
 190. Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, supra note 60, sched. 3, 
at 7, 8. 
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incommensurable?  Moreover, if the body were effective, 
would the public interest really benefit from the 
transformation of a cacophony of voices into the milquetoast 
of neutral and balanced homogeneity? 
The problem is particularly acute with respect to the 
reporting aspect of the Leveson recommendations, as opposed 
to its newsgathering proposals.  Even if the self-regulatory 
organization as structured by Leveson could reach consensus 
with regard to the inappropriate use of surreptitious 
newsgathering techniques (especially in the infotainment 
context of tabloid coverage), second-guessing editorial and 
publication decisions is more problematic.  The Leveson 
Report itself un-self-consciously adopts a judicial stance, 
rejecting publication decisions as to which reasonable minds 
could disagree.  Its suggestion that the press claiming a 
public interest defense should make available the details of 
its weighing of interests is unrealistic in light of the time 
pressures of reporting today, and constitutes an invitation to 
Monday morning quarter-backing. 
Many publication decisions have to be made quickly, on 
the basis of inadequate information, without a clear 
understanding of their possible impacts, on the basis of an 
assessment of their apparent importance at that moment.  
Editors could differ among themselves as to publication 
choices, and the same editors could even make different 
choices on another day.  While the Leveson recommendation 
of internal governance and compliance systems might be 
helpful in journalistic self-assessments on this score, 
legalistic external review is likely to have a chilling effect far 
beyond the precincts of the tabloid newsrooms which are the 
true targets of the Leveson Report.191 
 
 191. The Ed Miliband controversy is a useful lens through which to look at 
this question.  The Daily Mail published an article impugning the loyalty to 
Britain of Marxist theorist Ralph Miliband, opposition leader Ed Miliband’s 
deceased father.  See, e.g., Jamie Doward & Toby Helm, How The Mail 
Blundered Into A Vicious Battle With Labour, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 5, 2013), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/05/daily-mail-battle-
labour-lord-rothermere.  It is undisputed that the Daily Mail, under editor Paul 
Dacre, is an opinionated Conservative voice with a strong anti-socialist stance 
and a penchant for shrill and attention-grabbing headlines.  Although many 
Britons seem to agree that the paper’s headline accusing Ralph Miliband of 
“hating” Britain on the basis of a snippet of teenage writing was inaccurate and 
would warrant an apology from the paper, there is true disagreement both as to 
the meanings/claims of the story and as to its newsworthiness.  On one 
narrative, it is important for the public to know the political views of the 
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2. Cyclical Review and Systemic Ad Hoc Review Power 
The Board of the Recognition Panel must review the 
recognition of a regulator according to a cyclical schedule 
established in the Charter.192  It may also review the 
recognition of a regulator under “exceptional circumstances” 
in the public interest.193  Finally, it can withdraw recognition 
not only when the regulator is not meeting the Recognition 
Criteria, but even when the Recognition Panel has 
“insufficient information to determine” whether it is doing 
so.194 
The speech-deterring effect of this Scheme of Recognition 
is obvious on its face.  Exceptional circumstances are not 
defined in the Charter.  The Report is not clear about how to 
define systemic misbehavior despite the new press regulator’s 
 
outspoken father of a politician possibly in line to be Prime Minister because 
they may raise questions about the politician’s own commitments.  On the 
contrary narrative, the Mail’s story was little more than a trumped-up political 
hatchet job using irrelevant and over-interpreted information about his parent 
in order to undermine a rising politician from the paper’s competitor party.  On 
yet another set of contending narratives, the Mail either engaged in an 
outrageous personal insult, or chose to report on a sensitive personal topic in 
pursuit of the public interest.  To one degree or another, any or all of those 
explanations may be “true”—although most would agree that Dacre suffered a 
lapse of judgment (and the headline overstated the story).  See Roy Greenslade, 
Ed Miliband’s Challenge To Daily Mail Exposes Editor Paul Dacre As A Bully, 
THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2013/oct/02/edmiliband-
pauldacre (arguing that even though the issue of Ralph Miliband’s views was a 
legitimate topic for the paper, its headline conclusion was “over the top” and 
made the paper a bully).  But because the “truth” of the story can be assayed at 
different levels and with different results, this argument cannot be dismissed 
simply as an analogy to the false equivalence of “he said-she said” journalism 
decried by journalism theorists.  See, e.g., Jay Rosen, He Said, She Said 
Journalism: Lame Formula in the Land of the Active User, PRESSTHINK, (Apr. 
12, 2013), available at http://pressthink.org/2009/04/he-said-she-said-
journalism-lame-formula-in-the-land-of-the-active-user/.  Which of the various 
narratives offered above (and there are of course others as well) is objectively 
“true” is not a question that should be decided by a government-backed private 
regulator.  It should be noted that the paper printed Ed Miliband’s response to 
its article in its entirety. (The Mail was hoisted on its own petard—Dacre’s 
mistake ironically re-invigorated the press regulation movement).  In any event, 
when Mr. Miliband himself escalated the story to be not about a bad call on a 
particular editorial decision, but an example of a problematic journalistic 
culture—harking back to the language of the Leveson Inquiry—he ironically 
demonstrated the problem inherent in Leveson’s regulatory hybrid. 
 192. Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, supra note 60, at sched. 
2, 5–6. 
 193. Id. at sched. 2, 8–9. 
 194. Id. at sched. 2, 11. 
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ability to impose very significant fines for systemic 
misbehavior or failure to comply with its rulings.195  The PCC 
is faulted for not having seen that phone-hacking had become 
a systemic press activity and for having believed the 
representations of the News of the World staff that phone-
hacking there had been limited to one rogue reporter.  How 
will the new press regulator make sure not to fall into the 
same trap?  Will every complaint potentially be seen as 
evidence of systemic malfunction?196  Will history impel the 
Recognition Panel and the regulator to intrude into editorial 
decisions with roving consistency simply to ensure that any 
given complaint does not present a systemic problem? 
A fundamental difficulty with the inquisitorial power 
over systemic problems is that, structurally, the Recognition 
Body faces significant incentives to regulate.  In addition to 
the oft-noted institutional incentives of regulators to regulate, 
the press regulatory bodies face the additional pressures of 
transparency requirements197 that place their activities under 
the microscope of groups with regulatory agendas.  Knowing 
that the Charter’s transparency requirements would open its 
decision-making to public oversight and challenge by interest 
groups such as Hacked Off, both the Recognition Body and 
the press self-regulator operate under distinct incentives to 
appear effective by engaging in broad-scale investigation. 
3. Third Party Complaints 
By retaining the cost-free character of the PCC complaint 
review process, but by permitting third party complaints to be 
brought against press coverage, the Leveson Report opens the 
floodgates to complaints about press coverage.  It also invites 
politicization of press regulation—responding to the 
ideological commitments of complaining interest groups.  
Moreover, by inviting advocacy groups to bring claims about 
what it characterizes as “discriminatory” news coverage to 
 
 195. The possible chilling effect of million pound fines imposed on those 
newspapers that are deemed by the self-regulatory body to have failed to comply 
with the body’s requirements is self-evident.  Royal Charter, supra note 60, 
sched. 3. 
 196. The recognition body is also granted significant investigatory leeway 
and power to command the production of documents and information in its 
convenience under the proposed Royal Charter.  See generally Royal Charter, 
supra note 60, sched. 2. 
 197. Royal Charter, supra note 60, at 13.1 & sched. 3. 
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the press regulator, the Report transforms the press regulator 
into a super-editor, deeply embedded in the fundamental 
editorial decisions about what gets covered and how.  It is 
highly likely that opinionated, partisan papers will cover 
news in ways that various advocacy and affinity groups would 
see as discriminatory, insufficient, insensitive, and 
inaccurate.  If questions of truth and accuracy—which are 
sufficiently difficult to ascertain with respect to isolated facts 
and events—are to be freely brought with respect to a paper’s 
entire coverage, style, and editorial stance, then the press 
regulator will have succeeded in becoming a private censor of 
the newspaper industry, protected under the rubric of public 
power.198 
4. Pre-Publication Review 
The “offer” of pre-publication review by the regulator 
further exacerbates concerns about chill.199  Although the 
proposal recommends that such a review service be entirely 
voluntary, there is a non-trivial danger that it could become a 
factor in later litigation in assessing the newspaper’s 
 
 198. The Leveson Report noted that the Inquiry had received evidence from 
public interest groups indicating that the need to have a victim come forward 
made “generic” kinds of complaints about inaccurate press coverage effectively 
“unchallengeable.”  LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, vol. I, pt. A, ch. 2, at 22.  
That seems to overstate the problem, at least in many cases. 
  The authority to direct the placement of retractions, corrections and 
apologies has also been criticized as leading to chilling effects.  See, e.g., Right 
Hon. Peter Lilley MP, Royal Charter on Press Conduct, RT HON PETER LILLEY 
MP, (Mar. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.peterlilley.co.uk/parliamentaryspeeches/1729/royal-charter-press-
conduct (criticizing charter’s provisions as creating a “mini, self-appointed 
Ministry of Truth.”); Index on Censorship, Leveson, The Royal Charter, And 
Press Pegulation, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, (Apr. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/04/index-on-censorship-leveson-royal-
charter-and-press-regulation/ (the power to direct the wording and placement of 
apologies and corrections opposed as an “effective transfer of editorial control 
[representing] a level of external interference with editorial procedures that 
would undermine editorial independence and undermine press freedom.”).  Cf. 
Article 19, UK: Draft Royal Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, ARTICLE 19, 
(Apr. 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3687/en/uk:-draft-royal-charter-
on-self-regulation-of-the-press (recommending a narrowed scope for the press 
regulator’s ability to direct the nature, extent and placement of corrections and 
apologies). 
 199. More indirectly, so does the Charter’s directive that the Recognition 
Panel “publish policies, guidance and information . . . .”  Royal Charter on Self-
Regulation of the Press, supra note 60, at sched. 2, 13. 
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behavior.200  If a newspaper either did not seek pre-
publication clearance or decided to act contrary to the advice 
given, negative inferences could be drawn, thereby making 
the voluntary advisory service an affirmative requirement 
“through the back door.”201  Is it not predictable that refusals 
to take advantage of such an offer could be interpreted as 
reckless?  If so, then the editorial function would have been 
outsourced to a non-journalist body likely to be skeptical of 
press decisions in perhaps the most difficult cases. 
Pre-publication review also brings into sharp relief the 
potential conflicts in the complex regulatory scheme under 
Leveson.  The self-regulatory body is assigned a multiplicity 
of tasks and roles under the proposed regulatory system.  It 
would not be irrational for newspapers to fear that if they did 
not comply with pre-publication review recommendations, 
arbitral consequences against them could foreseeably 
ensue.202 
5. Exemplary Damages and Costs 
The exemplary damages203 and costs aspects of the 
 
 200. The Royal Charter does not make this Leveson Report recommendation 
mandatory and states that a failure to comply with this specific 
recommendation (among a few others) will not lead the regulator to lose its 
Royal Charter accreditation.  Charter on Self-Regulation of the Press, supra 
note 60, at sched. 2, no. 4.  Nevertheless, it permits the Board of the Recognition 
Panel to take the availability of pre-publication review into account.  Id.  See 
also id. at sched. 3, no. 17.  Such a service can all-too-easily be transformed into 
a behavioral expectation non-compliance with which could be considered 
culpable by courts or arbitrators in press complaint cases. 
 201. David Hooper & Brid Jordan, Phone Hacking and the Press: The Leveson 
Report, at 43. 
 202. The newspaper industry also objects to the forced apologies and 
retractions contemplated by the Royal Charter system.  See, e.g., WAN-IFRA, 
PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4, at 15.  The potentially chilling effect of such 
remedies is obvious and need not require further elaboration here. 
 203. Although it is unlikely that British press regulation would be rejected 
vel non under the European Convention on Human Rights, some have argued 
that a narrower ground for appeal might be the exemplary damages provision in 
the Court and Crimes Act.  If, for example, a court in a media tort action were to 
impose exemplary damages on a newspaper that had not joined a certified self-
regulatory body, the paper arguably could claim a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
  It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the contending views on 
whether liability for exemplary damages would be unlawful under Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.  See Potter, supra note 76 
(referring to contending legal opinions on the subject).  It should be noted, 
however, that the British newspapers are reportedly planning an appeal to the 
European Court of Human Rights in the event that they are subject to 
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exemplary damages in media tort actions simply because they have not 
subscribed to a self-regulatory body recognized under the Royal Charter.  Lisa 
O’Carroll, Papers Plan European Legal Action If They Are Penalised For 
Regulation Stance, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 10, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/10/newspapers-appeal-europe-
press-regulation (quoting a press industry source as saying “[y]ou have to go to 
Europe as the consequences are so bad in terms of costs and exemplary 
damages that you can’t just sit there and take them.”). 
  Of course, the papers would first have to exhaust local remedies—the 
U.K. courts—before they could appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.  
See ANDREW NICOL, GAVIN MILLAR & ANDREW SHARLAND, MEDIA LAW AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 75 (2d ed. 2009).  In any event, it should be noted that the 
prospect is distant in time because a number of time-consuming steps need to be 
taken before such a test could arise–including the full establishment of the 
recognition body under the Royal Charter, a lawsuit lost by the press, and the 
judicial imposition of exemplary damages on the newspaper seeking to appeal 
on Convention grounds. 
  Interestingly, recent reports indicate that the culture and media 
department of the UK government has rejected the Telegraph’s freedom of 
information request to disclose “ a paper which ‘is thought’  to set out advice on 
whether the government-sponsored royal charter breaches European law.”  Roy 
Greenslade, Government Refuses To Disclose Legal Opinion On Press 
Regulation, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/jan/19/press-regulation-
freedomofinformation.  A legal opinion previously commissioned by the 
newspaper publishers apparently concluded that the exemplary damages 
provisions were incompatible with the ECHR.  Id.  The Department of Culture 
and Media argued that “premature disclosure” of the legal advice “might close 
off better options” for ministers and officials.  Id.  A government spokesman 
apparently stated that legal advice was not routinely disclosed by the 
government and that “[w]e are clear that independent self-regulation of the 
press is entirely consistent with the European convention on human rights 
[sic].” Id.  This is far from a full and transparent answer to a question on such a 
fundamental issue. 
  Contending views have been expressed on the issue, although none have 
been made public in detail.  In its terms, Article 10 is a qualified right that, 
under the Convention, must be balanced against other rights. It is said that 
“context is all-important” in deciding the lawfulness of a restriction on 
expressive freedom under Article 10.  Article 8, which protects the right to 
privacy, is one of the contending obligations in the Convention.  The European 
Court of Human Rights has noted the need to balance the Article 10 right to 
free expression and the Article 8 right to reputation.  See, e.g., Cumpana and 
Mazare v. Romania, (2005) 41 EHRR4 (GC), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-67816)[113] (“[T]he 
Contracting States are permitted, or even obliged, by their positive obligations 
under Article 8 of the Convention . . . [t]o regulate the exercise of freedom of 
expression so as to ensure adequate protection by law of individuals’ 
reputations, they must not do so in a manner that unduly deters the media from 
fulfilling their role of alerting the public to a parent or suspected misuse of 
public power.”).  Where a regulation invokes a conflict between Convention 
provisions, courts must bring “intense focus” to the analysis of the comparative 
importance of the claimed rights in the individual case.  HUMAN RIGHTS 
REVIEW, supra note 203, at 349 (quoting In Re S (A Child), IDENTIFICATION: 
RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLICATION (2005) 1 AC 593, ¶ 17, per Lord Steyn).  The 
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Article 8 and Article 10 balance has also taken into account the public stature of 
the individual in question, the degree of interference with privacy, and any 
breach of law or professional ethics by the reporters.  Article 10: Freedom of 
Expression, HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW supra, 349–50 (2012). 
  Moreover, under Article 10(2) itself, restrictions on expression are 
permitted if they are “necessary in a democratic society” “for the protection of 
the reputation or rights of others.” To the extent that the Leveson approach is 
seen as nothing more than accountable self–regulation of the press in a manner 
analogous to the laws of other Convention member states, a win for the 
newspapers is far from inevitable.  Article 10 is set to protect political and 
public interest speech more than reporting on matters of “largely prurient 
interest.” HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW at 349.  Moreover, a recent report asserts 
that the European Court of Human Rights “has in recent years paid increasing 
attention to the extent to which journalists have complied with professional 
ethics in determining the parameters of article 10, particularly in cases in 
which serious issues of reputation and/or privacy are at stake.”  Id. at 349. 
  Analysts have addressed the question of whether compulsory regulation 
of the print media would be compatible with Article 10 ECHR.  See Hugh 
Tomlinson, Is Compulsory Regulation Of The Print Media Compatible With 
Article 10 ECHR?, UK HUMAN RIGHTS BLOG, (Aug. 22, 2012), available at 
http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2012/08/22/is-compulsory-regulation-of-the-print-
media-compatible-with-article-10-echr-hugh-tomlinson-qc/. Tomlinson concludes 
that “the answer may not be as entirely straightforward.”  The Court has never 
addressed the issue of “self-regulation” versus state regulation from the point of 
view of Article 10.  Id.  Tomlinson’s analysis: “The basic position seems clear.  
First, a system of compulsory media regulation is a prima facie interference 
with the right to freedom of expression and must, therefore, be justified under 
Article 10(2).  Second, such a system would, if enacted by statute, plainly be in 
accordance with law and would serve a legitimate aim (for example, the 
protection of the rights of others).  As a result, third, the crucial question would, 
therefore, be whether the system was “necessary in a democratic society”—
whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”  Id.  Tomlinson 
also notes that international human rights case law finds compulsory 
registration of journalists to be an unjustified interference with the right to 
freedom of expression. In his reading of the cases, “the international human 
rights jurisprudence makes it clear that any requirement which made the 
practice of journalism dependent on statutory licensing would be a violation of 
the right to freedom of expression.”  Id.  Yet compulsory regulation of large 
publishers is not necessarily the same thing as licensing journalists.  Id.  It has 
also been established that broadcast media regulation is not problematic under 
Article 10, so long as it is necessary and proportionate, and therefore 
compulsory regulation of the print media would not necessarily be problematic 
as such, according to Tomlinson. 
 Despite all that, however, it is possible that under precedents like the 
Naomi Campbell decision, the European Court of Human Rights might find that 
the cost and exemplary damages provision of the Court and Crimes Act 2013 
should be considered disproportionate and therefore violative of Article 10 in 
principle. The European Court has in the past found British press decisions to 
violate Article 10.  See Article 10: Freedom of expression, HUMAN RIGHTS 
REVIEW, 330, 339–40 (2012) (citing to Goodwin v. UK, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123 
(1996), in which the European Court of Human Rights ruled that a House of 
Lords decision requiring a journalists to disclose the identity of a source 
breached the journalist’s Article 10 rights, and the national media being 
granted access to private hearings before the Court of Protection).  And, in 2011, 
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carrot-and-stick inducement mechanisms recommended in 
the Leveson Report also pose a financial threat to the press, 
particularly to smaller and less commercially established 
entities.204  Exemplary damages could be extraordinarily 
expensive.  As for costs, publishers not members of an 
approved regulator and therefore not participating in 
arbitration might have to pay the plaintiff’s potentially 
expansive costs in media tort suits even if the publishers were 
substantively vindicated—again raising the likelihood of chill.  
Moreover, for any news organization, the decision whether to 
join the regulatory system will depend on comparing the costs 
of participation with the possibility of exemplary damages or 
no cost reimbursement.  Publishers who choose to forego 
joining a regulator are also “more likely to self-censor in order 
to minimise their exposure to the risk of being sued, even if 
they believe that it would be lawful to publish.”205  Despite 
attempts to ensure clarity of coverage, the structure of the 
proposed regime reflects uncertainty as to both those factors.  
The vagueness of the defined category is likely to pose a 
problem for a broad range of intermediate entities.206  
 
the European Court held that the 100% success fee that the court required the 
defendant to pay in a breach of confidence action, Naomi Campbell v. MGM, 
was out of proportion to the extent of damages awarded to the plaintiff, was 
disproportionate, and violated Article 10.  HUMAN RIGHTS REVIEW, supra, at 
362. 
  Ultimately, each inquiry under Article 10 is “fact specific,” requiring 
judicial analysis of the precise features of the regulatory scheme at issue. 
Tomlinson, supra.  “The nature of the regulator and the code which it applied 
would be relevant factors in the proportionality exercise, as would be the extent 
of the application of the compulsory regime. The Court would also take into 
account the “mischief” that the regulatory system was intended to deal with.  
Id.  According to one analyst addressing a compulsory approach prior to the 
issuance of the co-regulatory Leveson report, “[a] system of compulsory 
regulation for large publishers recommended by the Leveson inquiry would be 
designed to deal with the ‘mischief’ of wholesale invasion of rights identified by 
the Inquiry. If the regulator was independent of all government influence and 
applied a Code drawn up with substantial import from the media and 
journalists these would all be factors which the Court would take into account 
in the ‘justification exercise.’ ”  Id.  See also Anthony Lester, Two Cheers for the 
First Amendment, 8 HARV.  L. & POL’Y REV. 177, 191 (2014) (contending that the 
system’s punitive sanctions are unlikely to pass muster in the ECtHR). 
 204. Although small entities have the most to fear, it should not be forgotten 
that the entire newspaper sector has been struggling financially world-wide, to 
greater and lesser degrees. 
 205. Anthony, supra note 113, at 5. 
 206. Bloggers have noted this concern.  See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Act Now To 
Stop The UK Leveson Press-Regulations From Applying To Blogs And 
Individuals Online!, BOINGBOING, (Mar. 22, 2013), available at 
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Depending on the specific costs of joining the new system, an 
online news provider could face a financially onerous choice 
either way. 
6. Arbitration 
As for arbitration, a free arbitral process for all media 
disputes—especially when joined with a recent possible 
government proposal for “cost protection” in defamation and 
privacy claims to protect those of “modest means”207—could 
induce the filing of many five- or six-figure damage claims 
over privacy complaints or inaccuracies against the quality 
press (not to mention the tabloids).208  This has been a 
 
http://boingboing.net/2013/03/22/act-now-to-stop-the-uk-leveson.html; Cory 
Doctorow, UK Press-Regulation Defines “Press” So Broadly As To Include 
Tweeters, Facebook Users, Bloggers, BOINGBOING, (Mar. 18, 2013), available at 
http://boingboing.net/2013/03/18/uk-press-regulation-defines.html; Cory 
Doctorow, More On The Impact Of UK Press Regulation On Blogs, Websites, 
Tweeters, And Social Media, BOINGBOING, (Mar. 19, 2013), available at 
http://boingboing.net/2013/03/19/more-on-the-impact-of-uk-press.html.  See also 
infra notes 212–14. 
 207. The British government issued a consultation paper on such a cost 
protection proposal.  See Ministry of Justice, Costs Protection in Defamation and 
Privacy Claims: The Government’s Proposals, (Nov. 8, 2013), available at 
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/costs-protection-in-
defamation-and-privacy-
claims/supporting_documents/Costsprotectionindefamationandprivacyclaimscon
sultationpaper.pdf. 
 208. Admittedly, having identified this issue, the Leveson Report 
recommended that any free arbitral process include “a system to allow frivolous 
or vexatious claims to be struck out at an early stage.”  LEVESON REPORT, 
supra note 7, at 1769. This is not a sufficient safeguard, however. 
  Recent suggestions designed to achieve that goal make the problems 
self-evident. Some suggest that such a system could be adopted without conflict 
with Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights, and could include, 
for example, “a mandatory, 28-day ‘fast track’ adjudication process . . . [akin to 
one introduced for the construction industry in 1996].”  Sir Charles Gray & 
Alastair Brett, Press Regulation: Speedy Adjudication Could Help Break 
Leveson Impasse, THE GUARDIAN, (Sept. 29, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/sep/29/press-regulation-fast-track-
adjudication. Whatever the ease with which construction disputes can be 
resolved on a fast-track basis, it might be questioned whether Gray and Brett’s 
proposal for an independent arbitrator would in fact “enable[] most [press] 
actions to be settled within days.”  Id.  Identified “key issues” such as “the 
meaning of the words complained of, or if they are an honest comment or 
statement of fact or in the public interest,” are not often likely to be susceptible 
of such quick and easy resolution.  Id.  Moreover, to the extent that this 
proposal would have the new press regulator use “a small group of experienced 
independent lawyers to filter claims”—even as to whether they would go 
forward to the twenty-eight-day fast track adjudication—the choke-point 
problem would be rendered even more acute.  See id. 
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particular concern for the financially strapped regional press 
in Britain.209  There are also questions whether the structure 
of the compulsory arbitration approach would sufficiently 
protect expressive press values. 
7. Uncertainty and Incoherence as to Scope of Coverage 
One of the major problems facing the proposed press 
regulation scheme is its scope of coverage.  It clearly covers 
the traditional print newspaper, but what other entities are 
likely to be swept into the regulatory net? 
The Leveson Report makes unpersuasive distinctions 
between the print press and online journalism.210  Leveson 
recognizes that the organization might not be appropriate for 
small blogs.211  In keeping with that intuition, both the 
Crimes and Courts Act 2013 legislation—permitting 
exemplary damages—and the Royal Charter for the 
Recognition Panel attempt to limit the systems’ coverage to 
more established entities.  The post-Leveson attempt to 
define the scope of the Royal Charter’s coverage vis-à-vis 
Internet news organizations does not solve the problem of the 
scope of coverage, however. 
Thus, for example, the current legislation in the Crimes 
and Courts Act 2013 contemplates application of the cost 
 
 209. The regional and local newspapers—whose processes were generally 
approved by the Leveson Report—have strongly argued against Leveson’s 
proposed arbitral arm for this reason.  See, e.g., Lisa O’Carroll, Nick Clegg 
Urged To Consult Local Papers Over Press Regulation Royal Charter, THE 
GUARDIAN, (Apr. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/apr/18/press-regulation-royal-charter-
nick-clgg; LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7 (clearing the regional and local 
newspaper press of the culture of illegality for which he criticized elements of 
the national press).  It is not clear that the concession in the new Royal Charter 
allowing regional papers showing serious harm to opt out of arbitration is 
sufficient to eliminate the papers’ concerns.  The statute nowhere explains 
either the burden of proof or what is to count as a showing of “serious” financial 
hardship. 
 210. Editorial, Fleet Street’s Grim Reaper, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2012 
(noting that the Leveson Report showed little interest in the media industry’s 
future, and concluding that it “already seems dated.”).  The Economist asks: 
“Should an offensive blog post be treated in the same way as an offensive article 
on a newspaper website?  How about a comment—or a tweet? Does it still make 
sense to regulate the press, as opposed to all public writing? The lawyers and 
politicians grappling with these questions got little guidance from Lord Justice 
Leveson . . . .”  Id.  Cf. Adam Cohen, The Media That Need Citizens: The First 
Amendment and The Fifth Estate, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (“As journalism 
moves forward, media law and policy are looking backward.”). 
 211. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, vol. IV, pt. K, ch. 7, ¶ 6.35, at 1779. 
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incentive scheme to “relevant publishers”—including, but not 
limited to, newspaper publishers.212  Under the Act, a news 
purveyor would have to satisfy four cumulative criteria in 
order to be deemed a “relevant publisher”: that it publish 
“news-related material,” “in the course of a business” whether 
or not for profit, producing material “written by different 
authors,” and “subject to editorial control” over content, 
presentation, and publication decision.213  In turn, “news-
related material” is defined very broadly, including news or 
information about current affairs, opinion about matters 
relating to the news or current affairs, gossip about 
celebrities or public figures in the news.  The statute 
specifically excludes broadcasters, “special interest titles,” 
scientific or academic journals, public bodies and charities, 
company news publications, book publishers, and micro-
business blogs (with multiple authors, fewer than ten 
employees and an annual turnover of no more than £ 2 
million).214 
In addition to specifically excluded entities, discussion in 
the House of Commons indicated that the “relevant 
publisher” category was intended to catch “more sophisticated 
news publishers” and not “small-scale activity online.”215  
Then-Culture Secretary Miller specified news aggregation 
services such as Yahoo and Google, social networking sites, 
and sites which moderate others’ comments or aggregate 
blogs “without any active consideration of the content” as 
excluded services.216  Yet a recent report by English PEN 
concludes that categories of publishers “that the government 
itself intended to be exempt” will be expected to join the 
regulator, and that charities, not-for-profit community 
newspapers, political parties, some specialist publications will 
also be swept into the definition of relevant publishers.217  
Moreover, otherwise similarly-situated web sites will be 
 
 212. Crimes and Courts Act 2013, ch. 22, §§ 34, 35.  The Royal Charter, in 
sched. 4, specifically incorporates the definition of “relevant publisher” under 
the Crimes and Courts Act 2013, § 41.  For a recent critique of the 
indeterminacy of the “relevant publishers” category, see generally Anthony, 
supra note 113. 
 213. Crimes and Courts Act 2013, ch. 22, § 41.  See also Potter, supra note 
76. 
 214. Crime and Courts Act 2013, sched. 15. 
 215. Potter, supra note 76 (quoting then-Culture Secretary Maria Miller). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Anthony, supra note 113, at 3, 5, 7, 9–14. 
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classed differently.  For example, because they are operated 
by broadcasters, the websites of BBC and Sky News will not 
be characterized as “relevant publishers,” while those of The 
Guardian and The Times will be.218 
Despite attempts to carve up the universe of news 
purveyors in the legislation itself, there is a significant risk 
that many small publishers will either be swept into the new 
regulatory regime because they do not fit exactly into the 
scheduled exemptions, or believe that they are, therefore 
leading them to feel compelled to join the regulatory 
regime.219  This is also because the list of covered publishers 
includes everyone, with a few exemptions, rather than the 
other way around.  Moreover, such a piecemeal list of 
exempted publishers reads like a laundry list of publishers 
who succeeded in arguing their way out of the definition as 
part of political compromise rather than a list generated by a 
clear, thought-out, policy analysis.  One can imagine any 
number of disseminators of news-related material who would 
reasonably entertain questions about their status under this 
system.220 
In addition, the distinctions in coverage are difficult to 
square.  For example, many local newspapers might satisfy 
the exclusion threshold for micro-businesses.221  What 
principle, though, justifies their exclusion vis-à-vis larger 
newspapers?  Is the distinction designed as a proxy for 
influence?  If so, does size necessarily matter?  Do individuals 
with extensive followings on Twitter and Facebook 
necessarily have less influence in the news ecosystem than 
mid-size regional newspapers? And if websites run by 
newspaper organizations would be subject to Royal Charter 
provisions while those run by Internet companies (such as 
Google) or broadcasters would not be covered,222 then such a 
result both undermines the effectiveness of the system and 
raises questions about the underlying rationale for the 
 
 218. Id. at 15. 
 219. See, e.g., id. at 9–12. 
 220. Commentators have mentioned the status of news agencies such as the 
Press Association, independent organizations such as the Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism, and student newspapers. 
 221. Micro-businesses are defined as having fewer than ten employees and a 
turnover of less than £2,000,000.  See Crime & Courts Act 2013, sched. 15, § 
8(4); Anthony supra note 113, at 14. 
 222. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4 at 15. 
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definitional approach.  If the reason for excluding small 
Internet publications is that their reporting will not likely 
have the same impact as the tabloids, then query whether 
that is still the case or, in any event, will continue to be the 
case in the future?  And why interfere in the evolution of the 
news ecosystem if such interference will not ensure privacy 
for subjects of press attention?  Similarly, why exclude small, 
multi-author blogs while refusing to protect community-based 
online papers, or some powerful blogs because they fit into 
the micro-business category, while including as relevant 
publishers blogs that are in fact less influential but operated 
with more employees and a bigger purse?223 
In a thorough recent analysis of the “relevant publisher” 
category under the Crimes and Courts Act, English PEN 
concluded that “there is a worrying lack of clarity regarding 
the classification of relevant publisher[]”224  and that the 
current regime “will create uncertainty and chill freedom of 
expression.”225  As a result, English PEN “calls for an urgent 
review of the legislation.”226 
8. The Third Leg of the Stool: Changed Legal Rules 
Affecting Newsgathering 
When one takes a bird’s eye view, the British press is at 
risk of constraint from a multi-pronged control strategy—
from the combination of the self-regulatory process, 
government pressure justified by national security, and a 
rollback of access to information for reporting.  The Report’s 
recommendations for legal changes beyond civil law 
recognition of exemplary damages thus also raise the 
possibility of press intimidation.227 
 
 223. Anthony, supra note 113, at 15. 
 224. Id. at 5. 
 225. Id. at 3. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Although a detailed assessment of these changes is beyond the scope of 
this Article, it can be said that some of the recommendations regarding data 
protection and reforms of journalistic protections in the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE) are likely to stymie newsgathering.  See Alex Bailin, 
Leveson: Police And The Media, The Proposals, INFORRM’S BLOG, (Dec. 3, 2012), 
available at http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/12/03/leveson-police-and-the-
media-the-proposals-alex-bailin-qc/ (discussing the implications of Leveson’s 
proposals for legal changes); Gillian Phillips, Media Law After Leveson: A View 
From The Coalface, POLICY BRIEF, THE FOUNDATION FOR LAW, JUSTICE AND 
SOC’Y (Apr. 2013). 
380 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol: 55 
E. Will Regulatory Benefits Likely Outweigh the Risks of 
Chill? 
Lord Justice Leveson’s rather sanguine conclusions 
denying chill implicitly rest on a press trade-off: a belief that 
a certain amount of press deterrence is acceptable if other 
important values are served thereby—so long as it does not 
result from formal and direct state control.  At least one 
question is whether such values are in fact likely to be served 
by press regulation. 
The answer to this question is “no.”  At a minimum, the 
risk of chill should caution against regulation: (1) when 
regulation is unlikely to achieve its principal asserted goals, 
and (2) when attempts to cabin the chilling impact are not 
likely to be reliable.  This is particularly the case at times 
when government actions worldwide require a courageous 
press to be unafraid to hold the government accountable. 
1. Ineffectiveness in Protecting Privacy 
The starting point for the Leveson balancing approach is 
a sense that self-regulatory obligations placed on the press 
constitute a worthwhile exchange for the protection of other 
public values such as privacy.  The legitimacy of imposing 
such commitments on the press would diminish if they could 
not realistically ensure protection of the counter-weighing 
values.  But the Leveson Report does not assess the likely 
effectiveness of its model on the privacy side of the balance it 
advances.  Simply put, it does not answer the question 
whether muzzling the U.K. press would in fact sufficiently 
protect press victims’ privacy and dignitary interests in 
practice. 
The United Kingdom does not protect privacy, as such, in 
its common law.  So why should it protect privacy directly 
only against the class of press defendants?  Moreover, 
newspaper publishers have argued that it makes little sense 
to constrain the publication choices of British media when the 
very material at issue is globally available via the Internet.228  
 
 228. For example, one might wonder whether prohibitions on British tabloid 
publication of nude pictures of Prince Harry actually succeeded in protecting 
the royals’ privacy and dignity when the photos were instantaneously available 
on the Internet elsewhere to curious audiences doubtless including British 
citizens.  See LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, pt. C,  3.7, at 165 (mentioning this 
argument).  See also Louise Eccles, Rebecca English & Alan Hall, Royal privacy 
row as German tabloid publishes picture of the Duchess of Cambridge’s bare 
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The reality of instantaneous worldwide dissemination of 
private information enabled by the Internet is that territorial 
prohibitions on the press are unlikely realistically to protect 
the privacy interests of the subjects of media attention.229  In 
other words, effectiveness at press censorship will not 
necessarily lead to effectiveness in protecting press victims.  
Can we really conclude that press regulation will be effective 
and credible if it will impose asymmetric costs on one part of 
the Fourth Estate without assuring corresponding benefits 
with respect to other aspects of the public interest?230 
 
behind when her skirt blew up during Australia tour, MAIL ONLINE, (May 27, 
2014), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2639702/Royal-
privacy-row-German-tabloid-website-publishes-picture-Duchess-Cambridges-
skirt-blew-Australia-tour.html (describing German tabloid’s publication of 
derriere-revealing Duchess of Cambridge pictures). 
 229. A key goal articulated by the Leveson Report is that its proposed 
solutions “be perceived as effective and credible both by the press as an industry 
and by the public.”  LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, vol. IV, pt. K, ch. 1, at 1583.  
It has been argued that “the burgeoning of the internet is likely to render 
irrelevant much of the work of the Inquiry.”  LEVESON REPORT, at 736 ¶ 3.1 
(noting and rejecting such arguments).  In other words, how can territorial 
regulation be effective in a world of instantaneous global communications?  See, 
e.g., Peter Preston, Leveson: An Elephantine, Sloppy Exercise In Cut-And-Paste, 
THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/dec/02/lord-justice-leveson-inquiry-
newspapers (“The idea that politicians (and newspaper proprietors) will 
suddenly discover a perfect way of regulating the press is bunk. To see that, 
turn to the single most depressing part of Brian Leveson’s magnum opus and 
the paragraphs of chop-logic where he pretends that Twitter, Facebook and the 
rest don’t exist.  Who cares if Prince Harry’s Las Vegas revels and Princess 
Kate’s sunbathing are all over the net?  Ethical, regulated newspapers are 
required to pretend that US privacy laws, French snappers and international 
celebrity websites that 90% of the British population can click to somehow don’t 
exist. It’s a ludicrous proposition. But Leveson, safe shuffling bundles in the 
warmth of his Strand courtroom, has nothing else useful to say.”). 
  But Leveson supporters would argue that British press regulation could 
be perfectly effective, despite the Internet, because it would cover both British 
print newspapers and their online offerings, not to mention those of any foreign 
news outlets operating in Britain and/or targeting the British audience online.  
The British audience, then, could be spared access to material that did not 
comply with the press regulatory regime.  Unless Britain censors the Internet, 
however, information online will have worldwide availability and could be 
accessed via outlets that do not operate under Leveson restrictions. 
 230. In any event, even if statutory regulation could be effective in theory, 
the indirect character of the proxy press regulation as envisioned in the Royal 
Charter model is likely to mute its effectiveness at protecting plaintiffs in 
practice.  It increases transactions costs, and the need to understand and 
coordinate more than one part of a complex regulatory structure.  If signals are 
missed or misunderstood, then the very factors designed to protect the press 
could end up compromising the effectiveness of the regulation, sometimes in 
unpredictable ways. 
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2. Inability to Limit Impacts to the “Pestilential”231 
Tabloids 
To the extent that the predictable chilling effect extends 
to all facets of the British press, it compromises the press’ 
watchdog function.  To the degree that self-censorship 
principally affects the tabloid papers, then it potentially 
mutes or silences a particular moral vision, 232 and implicitly 
privileges an upper class type of journalism.233 
There is a widespread view—at least among the British 
middle class—“that the tabloid culture is pestilential.”234  It 
arouses contempt among elites, disdain from the “quality” 
press, and passionate accounts of intimidation from tabloid 
targets and press-reform advocacy groups such as Hacked 
Off.235  The tabloid press in Britain has historically engaged 
in invasive and cutthroat practices many of which most 
observers would find beyond the pale.236  The red-top papers’ 
publications policies are suspect as well.237  It is claimed that 
reprehensible tabloid practices continue unchecked because 
tabloid power intimidates critics, press “omerta”238 
discourages intra-press whistleblowing, and competition leads 
 
 231. Lloyd, supra note 145, at 218 (“A large number of people do think the 
tabloids are dreadful.  They think they have become largely outposts of the 
celebrity culture, that have a strong line in running sex scandals—mostly, too, 
among celebrities but not always – and that the news they carry, when it is not 
sex and celebrity, is often distorted and sometimes flat wrong.”). 
 232. Some have claimed that the British tabloid press sees itself as speaking 
truth to power and privilege, and even perhaps to be driven by a messianic 
fervor to call out violations of a particular (if contestable) moral vision.  See id. 
at 219.  Whatever one thinks of the tabs’ moral vision, regulation leading to its 
silencing is something to worry about—both from concerns about state-
responsive orthodoxy, and from vantage points prizing a diversity of voices. 
 233. See, e.g., John Steel, Leveson: Solution Or Symptom?  Class, Crisis, And 
The Degradation Of Civil Life, ETHICAL SPACE: THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF COMMUNICATION ETHICS, vol. 10, no. 1, at 8; Paul Dacre, Why Is The Left 
Obsessed By The Daily Mail?, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/12/left-daily-mail-paul-
dacre. 
 234. Lloyd, supra note 145, at 218. 
 235. HACKED OFF, supra note 42, available at http://hackinginquiry.org/. 
 236. See LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, at  (on “outrageous” press behavior, 
both in newsgathering and publishing).  Cf. Lidsky, supra note 151 (noting 
examples, inter alia the role of paparazzi in the auto accident leading to the 
death of Princess Diana). 
 237. They are often accused of printing (or at least implying) falsehood for 
partisan political gain; of degrading both public discourse and women’s rights 
by pandering sex and female nudity for profit; and of legitimating political 
ignorance by disregarding important political issues. 
 238. Bennet & Townend, supra note 181. 
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to imitation of the worst kinds of scoop-seeking practices and 
attention-grabbing headlines.239 
It is thus assumed that the tabloid papers are not the 
raucous free press whose goal is to hold government power to 
account, but simply a vehicle for pacifying the population 
with stories of personal sin and moral failure—providing 
“bread and circuses” rather than state-challenging 
accountability reporting.  Regulation proponents appear to 
believe that not much would be lost if Leveson-based press 
self-regulation were to result in chilling the noxious aspects of 
these culturally-specific tabloid entities.240 
 
 239. Engaging in the “dark arts” by tabloids is not a matter of individual 
journalistic decision, but of organizational policy decided at the top.  Carl 
Bernstein, Murdoch’s Watergate?, NEWSWEEK, (July 9, 2011), available at 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/07/10/murdoch-s-watergate.html 
(“As anyone in the business will tell you, the standards and culture of a 
journalistic institution are set from the top down, by its owner, publisher, and 
top editors. Reporters and editors do not routinely break the law, bribe 
policemen, wiretap, and generally conduct themselves like thugs unless it is a 
matter of recognized and understood policy. Private detectives and phone 
hackers do not become the primary sources of a newspaper’s information 
without the tacit knowledge and approval of the people at the top. . . .”).  Lord 
Justice Leveson found that the culture at the top of the News of the World 
created excessive pressure and competition among its journalists.  See LEVESON 
REPORT, supra note 7, vol. II, ch. 4, at 493 et seq. (discussing newsroom culture 
at the NOTW).  Carl Bernstein of Watergate fame reports that a former 
executive at News Corp charged that “Murdoch invented and established this 
culture in the newsroom, where you do whatever it takes to get the story, take 
no prisoners, destroy the competition, and the end will justify the means.”  
Rosen, supra note 145.  Given the competitiveness of the British tabloids, and 
the economic challenges felt by newspapers world-wide, it is no surprise to find 
that at least some of the other tabloid reporters would follow the lead of the 
News of the World and engage in the “dark arts” simply to remain competitive.  
See David Leigh, Scandal On Tap, THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 3, 2006), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2006/dec/04/mondaymediasection (noting 
phone hacking by tabloids); see also PA, Guardian Hacking Journalist David 
Leigh Won’t Be Charged, THE INDEPENDENT, (June 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/guardian-hacking-journalist-
david-leigh-wont-be-charged-7851045.html; James Robinson, Leveson inquiry: 
Guardian journalist justifies hacking if in the public interest, THE GUARDIAN, 
(Dec. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/dec/06/leveson-inquiry-guardian-
phone-hacking.  Even without the News of the World in the lead, such a tabloid 
press facing a new raft of competitive pressures might be tempted to challenge 
ordinary journalistic ethics even further in the future. 
 240. Given the gossipy, celebrity-focused, sex-laden coverage of these tabloid 
papers, the argument might go, reining in their worst excesses would not 
damage the democratic role and value of the press.  See LEVESON REPORT, 
supra note 7, vol. I, pt. B, ch. 2, ¶ 4.3, at 65 (adopting a political speech-focused 
view of the democratic benefits of free expression and a free press).  Similar 
arguments have been made with regard to the U.S. press.  See, e.g., Chris 
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But giving the government the power to classify the 
press, and declaring some journalism legitimate and other 
reporting junk, is likely to invite abuse and exploitation.  
Moreover, it generalizes too much to classify all tabloids all 
the time as archetypes of the “bad” press.  Tabloid journalism 
is not simply one thing, and tabloid newspapers have broken 
important public interest stories in the past.241  The Leveson 
Report could be criticized for assuming an impoverished 
vision of what the British press should be in its implicit 
dismissal of the tabloid press as a transgressive 
alternative.242  Perhaps the Leveson report erred in failing to 
 
Edelson, Lies, Damned Lies, and Journalism: Why Journalists Are Failing to 
Vindicate First Amendment Values and How a New Definition of “The Press” 
Can Help (arguing that the Press Clause should not offer any protection to US 
journalists or news institutions found to be engaging in “he said-she said” 
versions of balanced journalism rather than truth-telling). 
 241. See, e.g., Jonathan Freedland, In Defence Of Britain’s Tabloid 
Newpapers, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/03/defence-of-tabloid-
newspapers (“there is more to Britain’s tabloids than sleaze and celebrity . . . .  
For a true democracy cannot leave knowledge in the hands of the elite few; it 
has to be spread widely.”). 
 242. This criticism is not a defense of the legitimacy of the popular press 
simply on populist, anti-elitist grounds—that tabloid journalism is acceptable 
simply because red-tops are read by many in the working class.  See Mills, 
supra note 21, at 23 (explaining that “[d]efending the nature and content of 
tabloid news is often seen merely as an overtly populist desire to justify the 
popular.”).  The tabloids have been recognized by some for “promot[ing] a much 
wider agenda than for quality journalism”—an agenda “which is public-led, 
rather than quality journalism’s power-led agenda.”  Mills, supra note 21, at 29. 
It has been argued that by choosing not to speak to the middle-class audience, 
by staking out a different—and more advocacy-inspired—narrative voice, by 
actively seeking out “offence” as part of “legitimacy, effectiveness, and appeal, 
rather than an unfortunate by-product of a different way of telling the news[,]”  
Mills, supra note 21, at 25, the tabloids may have intentionally set themselves 
up to provide a self-consciously contrary type of journalism.  Moreover, some see 
the British tabloids as messianic avengers of a particular type of moral vision.  
At least in some of their coverage, tabloids seem to portray themselves as 
revealing hypocrisy, challenging accepted middle-class truths and public faces, 
and “speaking truth to power.”  “Official journalism rests on, and perpetuates, 
the assumption that there are a limited number of acceptable things to talk 
about, and ways to talk about them: the vilification of tabloid journalism, then, 
not only requires such assumptions, but helps to maintain such a system.” 
Mills, supra note 21, at 27–28. 
  Of course, these accounts of tabloidism are quite abstract.  When 
analyzed at the concrete level, it is easy to disapprove of much tabloid 
journalism—whether because their focus on sexual misconduct harks back to an 
outdated, 1950s sort of morality, because their emphasis on unmasking 
celebrity misbehavior distracts from the press’ central role as inculcator of 
democratic competence in the public, because these justifications have little to 
do with the pictures of naked women typically found on page three, and perhaps 
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address directly the class issue undergirding the relationship 
between the tabloid and quality press in Britain. Although 
progressives decry their viewpoints and methods, right-wing 
tabloids have sought political impact.  It is not only tabloid 
revelations of celebrities’ love lives that are at stake.243 
More generally, the Leveson approach creates a super-
structure affecting many more press organs than just the 
most offensive red-tops.  There is no reason to believe that 
press complaints adjudicated by the self-regulatory body will 
be limited to the activities of the tabloid journalists; they are 
likely to deter “responsible” accountability journalism as well.  
This is particularly true if government chooses to target non-
tabloid venues traditionally associated with investigative 
reporting in the public interest. 
F. Is the Leveson Report’s Framework Misguided in the 
New Media Age? 
Evolving journalism raises the fundamental question of 
whether the Leveson model’s focus on controlling the 
traditional print press misses the boat in today’s digital news 
environment.244  By promoting a backward-facing structure 
designed to control new media with old media norms and 
techniques, the Leveson approach flirts with futility and 
neglects the changes wrought by the digital fourth estate.  It 
may effectively increase censorship, reduce innovation, 
undermine new institutional growth, and increase the divide 
between traditional and new press. 
 
even because the tabloids’ focus on the individual and on scandal may serve to 
reinforce class structure and the marginalization of a working class rather than 
challenging it. 
  Ultimately, what can be said for sure is that views differ significantly 
about British tabloids.  Yet the Leveson Report did not transparently address 
these different kinds of claims to legitimacy by the British tabloid press. 
 243. Natalie Evans, Phone Hacking Trial: Sienna Miller ‘Left Daniel Craig “I 
Love You” Voicemail While Out With Boyfriend Jude Law, MIRROR, (Jan. 28, 
2014), available at http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/phone-hacking-trial-
sienna-miller-3069470. 
 244. The Leveson Report has been criticized for failing to spend much time 
on the Internet and online journalism.  The Report addresses “the relevance of 
the Internet” and the role of new media in a bit over one page.  LEVESON 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 736–37.  See also Rob Tricchinelli, Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, Could American press ever be subject to a 
stateside equivalent of the Leveson Inquiry? THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAW, 
Winter 2013, available at http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-
resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-winter-2013/could-american-
press-ever-b.  See also supra, note 229. 
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1. Changes in the Production and Dissemination of News 
The Leveson Report has been chided for its minimal 
attention to the Internet.  It distinguishes the Internet from 
the press by asserting that “the [I]nternet does not claim to 
operate by any particular ethical standards, still less high 
ones . . . so that bloggers and others may, if they choose, act 
with impunity.”245  Then, it asserts “a qualitative difference” 
between online and newspaper content, and assumes that as 
a result, “people will not assume that what they read on the 
Internet is trustworthy or that it carries any particular 
assurance or accuracy; it need be no more than one person’s 
view.”246  In the Leveson view, presumably, the non-
institutional blogosphere is not particularly powerful or 
influential, and regulating the mainstream press could 
effectively achieve the right balance in public discourse 
between speech and privacy regardless of the contributions of 
bloggers. 
The problem with this approach is that it is not 
particularly realistic today.  The Internet has changed the 
news landscape on every front.247  The networked Fourth 
Estate has already begun to generate new practitioners, 
practices, styles, and norms of journalism.  It could be argued 
that the Internet has democratized news—generated a 
broader, more expansive view of what we should consider to 
be news and how it should be made, disseminated, and 
discussed. 
Even now, it is arguably difficult to distinguish cleanly 
between the categories of blogs and the press248—as the 
Huffington Post has amply demonstrated.  Such a binary 
characterization does not reflect lived experience.  The 
blurring of that distinction will surely increase in the future.  
While the old media—newspapers, television, and radio—are 
“in retreat,”249 an Internet-based new media is emerging—
mixing, among others, solo blogs, old media web presences, 
group discussion web sites, Twitter, social media, and non-
 
 245. LEVESON REPORT, at 737 ¶ 3.3. 
 246. Id. 
 247. For a description of some changes brought to traditional journalism 
from digital networks, see Levi, supra note 159, at 1548–56.  See also 
Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 521–32 (March 19, 
2007) (on the changing nature of journalism). 
 248. See Benkler, supra note 11; Cohen, supra note 210, at 3. 
 249. Cohen, supra note 210, at 3. 
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profit online investigative organizations.250  The new media 
sector contains “a mixture of different kinds of actors: some 
are clearly journalists, some are communicators who would 
never be confused with journalists, and some lie in 
between.”251 
As established news institutions compete with new 
entrants into the news space, they increasingly involve their 
audience in the generation, processing, and vetting of news.252  
The types of sources seen as legitimate are expanded.  The 
new journalism involves crowd-sourcing information, using 
non-professional journalists’ material and photographic 
images, permitting the public to comment on stories—in sum, 
engaging in various sorts of pro-am journalism that is 
celebrated by what has been called the Future of News 
consensus.253  Some journalism is computer-generated, and 
does not even involve many journalists.254  Moreover, the 
availability of unparalleled amounts of data and the 
unprecedented capacity to manipulate it also make newly 
possible the growth of large-scale data-based journalism.255  
Although these kinds of online journalism still supplement 
traditional journalism, they increasingly “fill the gaps” left by 
the mainstream press’s declining resources.256  Moreover, 
journalism is now a much more tentative and iterative 
process requiring real time examination and evaluation of 
contested accounts of events.257 
 
 250. Id. at 3, 15–19. 
 251. Id. at 3, 14–15. 
 252. See, e.g., Brian McNair, Trust, Truth and Objectivity, in RETHINKING 
JOURNALISM: TRUST AND PARTICIPATION IN A TRANSFORMED NEWS LANDSCAPE 
83 (Chris Peters & M.J. Broersma, eds. 2012)  (describing The Guardian crowd-
sourcing project in 2011).  See also Crowdsourcing, THE GUARDIAN,  
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/crowdsourcing. 
 253. Dean Starkman, Confidence Game, COLUM. J. REV., (Nov. 8, 2011), 
available at http://www.cjr.org/essay/confidence_game.php?page=all (coining the 
phrase).  See also Levi, supra note 159, at 1548 (discussing the “new journalism” 
and the FON consensus); Cohen, supra note 210. 
 254. Steve Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real Human Wrote This Article, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/11/business/computer-generated-articles-are-
gaining-traction.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; The Pew Research Center’s 
Project for Excellence in Journalism, State of the News Media 2013, STATE OF 
THE NEWS MEDIA, overview at 3 (2013), available at http://stateofthemedia.org/. 
 255. See McNair, supra 252, at 82 (noting data-based journalism). 
 256. Cohen, supra note 210, at 4. 
 257. Alfred Hermida, Tweets And Truth: Journalism As A Discipline Of 
Collaborative Verification, JOURNALISM PRACTICE, (Mar. 27, 2012), available at 
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New entrants unaffiliated with the institutional press do, 
in fact, have (sometimes outsize) influence on global public 
discourse.  Much news today is distributed not by mainstream 
newspapers—although newspapers are still the most critical 
aspect of the modern news ecosystem258—but in one way or 
another processed by bloggers, aggregators, citizen 
journalists, random tweeters, story commenters, and social 
media friendship networks.  Internet sources get wide 
distribution by links. 
The Leveson assumptions about journalism online ignore 
the reality that important stories in the public interest can be 
broken these days by bloggers at home, unsavory 
whistleblowers, small non-profit online investigative outfits, 
and even ideologically-motivated examples of a renascent 
party press.259  Whether or not they do so in their pajamas,260 
bloggers and tweeters can affect the content, arc, duration, 
and intensity of news and public affairs coverage.  They may 
at least sometimes set the agenda for mainstream press 
coverage, and add reporting and images.  They may serve to 
publicize stories the mainstream media did not choose to 
publish.261 
They step into a vacuum increasingly created by the 
retrenchment of traditional print media institutions.  
Economic pressures on the traditional press have led it to 
reduce reporting power.262  Increasingly overstretched 
 
http://tandfonline.com/10.1080/17512786.2012.667269. 
 258. Levi, Social Media, supra note 159, at 1539 and sources cited therein.  
See also The Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, supra 
note 254. 
 259. See, e.g., The Drudge Report, available at http://www.drudgereport.com/.  
Daily Kos is an example of a liberal blog.  www.dailykos.net.  See also Cohen, 
supra note 210, at 23–26, 76.  This is even though, as Professor Ed Baker 
powerfully recognized, there is audience concentration in the blogosphere as 
well.  C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY 
OWNERSHIP MATTERS 107 (2007). 
  Diversity across the press sector can help a variety of press goals 
flourish.  If we are ambivalent about our social and press ends, it is “deeply 
unwise . . . to give exclusive dominion to one or another point of view.”  Robert 
Post, Understanding the First Amendment, 87 WASH. L. REV. 549, 560 (2012). 
 260. Larry E. Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics of 
Amateur Journalism, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185 (2006) (discussing image of 
bloggers in pajamas). 
 261. LEVESON REPORT, supra note 7, at 170–71 (describing use of blogs by 
newspapers as proxies). 
 262. See State of the News Media 2013, supra note 254, overview at 3 
(describing “shrinking reporting power” of the traditional press).  See also 
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editorial resources have also made the traditional press more 
reliant on the information provided by sophisticated 
newsmakers.263  And new practitioners of journalism online 
are increasingly being incorporated into “the larger media 
ecology.”264 
The transmission of news and information via the 
Internet also increases the global dimension of news.  It 
enables not only the delivery of hyper-local material and the 
“Daily Me” with its individually-tailored focus, but also the 
possibility of global audiences for what might previously have 
been thought of as issues of local or regional interest. 
Some nascent online news organizations have also begun 
to function as watchdogs over both government and private 
power.265  While they do not have the size and heft of the 
major players in the institutional press, they are also said to 
be undeterred by factors responsible for mainstream media’s 
restraint in criticizing government and powerful economic 
actors.266 
Even the style of journalism increasingly varies. The 
press increasingly includes activist journalists seeking to 
advance advocacy goals alongside more traditional journalists 
espousing professional norms of objectivity and neutrality.267  
Institutional relationships have also changed—with 
increasing collaborations by reporters and news organizations 
world-wide. 
Finally, some have provocatively questioned whether a 
“gray market in journalism” will inevitably be generated by 
the security state’s information lock-down and the intellectual 
property regime’s exclusionary framing of expression as 
 
Luckhurst, supra note 151 (referring to Index on Censorship chief executive 
John Kampfner’s argument that “journalism is too weak, not too strong” and 
reiterating the advice to Justice Leveson to “prevent wrongdoing without killing 
an already sick patient . . . .”). 
 263. State of the News Media 2013, supra note 254, overview at 3. 
 264. Cohen, supra note 210, at 26.  The uncertainty about scope of coverage 
is not resolved by the remedy provisions in the Crimes and Courts Act, 2013 
passed by Parliament to effectuate the Leveson incentives.  See Crimes and 
Courts Act, 2013, supra note 78. 
 265. Id. at 29–34. 
 266. Id. (describing examples of mainstream media timorousness over 
criticizing government and capture by corporate interests). 
 267. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 210, at 34.  Norms of objectivity have been 
claimed by newspapers in the US, as opposed to British newspapers, which 
have a history of partisan points of view. 
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property.268  At a minimum, all these developments have led 
to more variety in the news environment. 
These changes signal both change and increasing 
diversity in the current news landscape.  Yet the Leveson/
Royal Charter approach would likely hamper many 
significant and potentially beneficial aspects of the new 
production and dissemination infrastructure.  For example, 
strict liability for everything appearing in newspapers269—
including anything said in online comments, or any crowd-
sourced material, or material published for its 
newsworthiness (even if not its accuracy)—could, as a 
practical matter, lead to reduced reliance on precisely what is 
generative in the new journalism space.  The rational 
response to such a strict liability regime would be to shut off 
comments, avoid crowd-sourcing news stories, minimize 
reliance on unaffiliated photographers, and return to a pre-
digital press era.  In the era of the citizen journalist, when 
even the most mainstream of press organizations have 
involved their audience not only in commenting but also in 
the reporting of news, this approach is backward-looking and 
unrealistic. 
Applying the Leveson approach to new media threatens 
to undermine important democratizing developments over 
time.  Any self-regulatory body subject to continuing 
recognition body oversight under the Royal Charter is likely 
to adopt and apply a journalistic code of ethics in a 
disciplinary way.  This is obviously problematic for the 
traditional print press, but presents even greater 
foundational difficulties for the networked Fourth Estate.  
Moreover, it can be used by traditional commercial media as a 
weapon to delay innovation in digital journalism. 
2. The Illusory Benefits of Disciplinary Codes 
The entire structure undergirding the self-regulatory 
body requires the development of a coherent vision of the 
public interest and a regulator-developed journalistic code of 
ethics.  However, Justice Leveson’s belief in the ability of a 
journalistic code of ethics to provide clear guidelines for 
balancing public access to information and norms such as 
privacy is questionable in the current environment. 
 
 268. I am indebted to Patrick Gudridge for this provocation. 
 269. Royal Charter, supra note 60, sched. 3, at 8B. 
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Reliance on an ethics code subject to the imprimatur of 
the Royal Charter recognition body is arguably a problem for 
three reasons: first, because codes themselves by definition 
have complex relationships with lived practice; second, 
because a diverse media landscape and rapid evolutions in 
journalistic practices undermine the ability to articulate 
universal values in a code; and third, because disciplinary 
uses of codes enable incumbent-protective activity.270  
Application of an ethics code that does not adequately reflect 
this reality opens the door to more effective censorship. 
The Leveson Report’s reliance on an ethics code 
effectively transforms the code from a tool whose goal is to 
guide journalists’ actual practices (however ineffectively) into 
a disciplining device wielded by a powerful enforcement body, 
potentially against unpopular targets.  Because of the 
complicated relationship between journalism ethics codes and 
the actual practices of journalists, some would argue that it is 
misguided by definition to turn those codes into disciplinary 
metrics.271  It may be that the new environment of the 
globalizing news market and the networked Fourth Estate 
will further undermine the authority of codes (or at least 
generate a multiplicity of codes for the many different kinds 
of journalism that will be practiced)—as journalistic practice 
increasingly “eludes standardization.”272 
 
 270. For a critique of the chilling effect of the process by which the code is to 
be developed by the regulator, see supra text accompanying note 190. 
 271. At a minimum, it could be argued, it is a mistake for courts to test 
journalistic behavior by reference to either the broad or the concrete provisions 
of journalistic practice codes.  Just as the aspirational guidelines may be 
insufficiently directive in the multiplicity of concrete situations facing 
journalists, the concrete prohibitions in such codes (such as the common 
prohibition of paying for stories) may at times undermine the public interest in 
important information.  Zelizer, supra note 179, at 275 (describing examples in 
which “the unethical nature of news-gathering [and the use of checkbook 
journalism] . . . might have denied the US public fuller information critical to its 
functioning as a body politic.  Furthermore, ethics codes offer a sliding scale of 
evaluation: If paying for information was acceptable in these cases, who is to 
say where its appropriateness ends?”). 
  In addition, the availability of different journalistic ethics codes in the 
United States itself grants too much discretion to courts to select their preferred 
norms and judicially craft professional boundaries. 
 272. Zelizer, supra note 179, at 274.  It may also be that the codes don’t work 
except to the extent that the problems faced by the journalists are similar to 
problems they have previously encountered. Without exaggerating the changes 
wrought by the Internet, one can reasonably wonder whether past experience 
can continue to be all that directive when journalism is changing on all fronts—
newsgathering, presentation, and dissemination.  See also MEGAN KNIGHT & 
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Even if evolving codes—organically generated by 
engagement in the varieties of journalism developing today—
are useful to reporters and editors as advisory guides for 
conduct, it is questionable whether they can and should be 
used as disciplinary tools.273  As one proponent of the new 
journalism put it recently, “[g]ood journalism ethics don’t 
grow from strong rules.  Good journalism ethics grow from 
strong conversations about our values and about making good 
decisions based in those values.”274  The threat of censorship 
and the possible misuse of codes in that kind of context exist 
both for governmental bodies and for private press groups.275 
 
CLARE COOK, SOCIAL MEDIA FOR JOURNALISTS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
142 (2013) (noting that formal guidelines of many news organizations err “when 
they assume that the network is like the newsstand” and that the “more 
progressive” of those guidelines reflect the networked environment by placing “a 
greater emphasis on the autonomy of the journalist, and on their ability to 
make judgments on how they should behave in any given context.”). 
 273. See Peter Preston, Peter Preston: ‘Leveson Sees Journalism As An 
Exercise In Providing Cases For The Courts To Examine’, PRESS GAZETTE, (Feb. 
25, 2013), available at http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/content/peter-
prestonleveson-sees-journalism-exercise-providing-cases-courts-examine.  We 
should hesitate to transform journalism codes into legalized, disciplinary 
mechanisms also because professional values may be at odds with one another 
at different levels of analysis and with other professional values.  Weaver et al., 
infra note 276, at 473–94, 534–44. 
 274. Steve Buttry, Upholding And Updating Journalism Ethics: My Colorado 
Keynote, THE BUTTRY DIARY BLOG, (Mar. 15, 2014), available at 
http://stevebuttry.wordpress.com/2014/03/15/upholding-and-updating-
journalism-ethics-my-colorado-keynote/. 
 275. See Benkler, supra note 11 (noting that mainstream mass media largely 
disavowed the journalistic activities of Wikileaks).  See also, supra note 165, 
(describing Daily Mail’s criticism of The Guardian for publishing articles based 
on information leaked by Snowden). 
  Some have argued that “journalistic practice—as it takes shape in news 
gathering, news presentation, and news distribution—defies the establishment 
of meaningful ethical standards.” Zelizer, supra note 179, at 271.  There are 
lessons to be learned from the fact that journalists (by contrast to academics—
and, perhaps, judges)—“eschew and deride” ethics codes.  Id. at 272.  They are 
said to do so because “[t]hey see dominant approaches to ethics as simplifying, 
restricting, or ignoring the various materialities by which the news is crafted.”  
Id. at 272.  As press sociologist Barbie Zelizer has explained: “The problem with 
ethics derives in large part from . . . the difficulty that ensues in establishing 
standards for shifting practice . . . .  [N]ews-gathering takes shape in situations 
largely beyond the control of journalists, where rapidly unfolding news stories, 
high stakes, a marked degree of risk and inherent unpredictability are all part 
of the ground that journalists must navigate on their way to making news.  
News presentation, complicated perhaps more than ever before by corporatism, 
privatization, sensationalism and convergence, is often decided without the 
input of the journalist who gathered the news.  And news distribution in today’s 
online environment has multiple shapes, platforms and audiences, making one 
form of a news story a thing of the past.  Instead, multimodal journalists are 
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The Leveson Report gives the impression that many of 
the transformations enabled by the Internet would violate the 
norms likely to be developed by the self-regulatory body.276  
 
regularly expected to rework news angles for multiple objectives alongside non-
journalists who are doing the same. . . . Journalism is thus more porous, more 
unstable, more variegated and less authoritative than might be assumed.  
Though it may be relatively easy to delineate one’s ethical aspirations as a 
journalist, it is far more difficult to translate those aspirations into practice 
across the range of situations with which journalists regularly engage.”  Id. at 
273–74. 
  Even for old media, the codes serve principally as aspirational guides 
(with a few concrete prohibitions).  See Richard T. Karcher, Tort Law and 
Journalism Ethics, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 781, 783–85, 793 (2009) (describing the 
CCJ and SPJ codes and citing to numerous others).  For additional discussions 
of journalism codes in the US, see, for example, Blake D. Morant, The Endemic 
Reality of Media Ethics and Self-Restraint, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L.  ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y, 595 (2005); Jeff Storey, Does Ethics Make Good Law? A Case Study, 19 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 467 (2012).  Cf. Holger Sievert, Reporting (in) 
Europe: Heuristic Remarks on Old and New Research on ‘European Journalism’  
in COMMUNICATION AND LEADERSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE 
DIFFICULT PATH FROM CLASSICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS TO GENUINE 
MODERN COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT (H. Sievert / D. Bell, eds. 
2008) at 19–20, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=965732 (observing 
European journalistic diversity and noting that even in old media, and even 
within Europe, studies show significant variation in journalists’ professional 
self-concept and goals).  They are also artifacts of their historical contexts. For 
example, the history of Western journalism ethics codes has been described as 
reflecting the needs of a particular historical moment—as part of a shift from 
journalistic models of partisanship to those of professionalism and objectivity.  
See Zelizer, supra note 179, at 272–73 (“The first ethics codes in journalism 
came into being in the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, aligned 
with the ascent of a model of professionalism and a particular notion of 
modernity.  Richly implicated in the quest for truth, that mindset saw 
rationality, objectivity, impartiality and reason as the modes of engagement, 
which journalists could offer those needing information about the world and the 
ethics codes that reflected its values.  Ethics codes thus mirrored a 
transformation in journalists’ affiliations from reigning work models of 
partisanship to those of objectivity, and justified those hoping to promote 
journalism as more of a profession than an occupation.  In so doing they set in 
place a prism for evaluating journalistic practice that was aligned with 
particular expectations of professionalism in a particular kind of modern 
context.”). 
 276. For example, while big data (including government information and 
information collected from individuals’ online activities) creates the possibility 
for extraordinarily broad-scale investigative journalism, it also implicates issues 
of information privacy.  Pro-am investigative techniques, despite their many 
benefits, may also lead to increased error, failure to check sources adequately, 
and a contextual reporting.  See Levi, supra note 159, at 1556–73 (discussing 
the dangers of the “new journalism.”); Cohen, supra note 210, at 39 et seq.  One 
empirical study in 2007 found that online journalists were significantly more 
likely than their print (although not their broadcast) counterparts to say that 
numerous types of controversial reporting practices “may be justified on 
occasion.”  THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY: U.S. 
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Arguably, Leveson-compliant code-drafting entities would 
have incentives to craft codes of journalistic ethics skewing 
toward the norms of the traditional printed broadsheets.  If 
mainstream media feared the onslaught of competition from 
Internet-enabled non-professional journalism, for example, 
then wouldn’t code-drafting committees dominated by the 
mainstream institutional press have an incentive to draft 
journalism ethics codes that valorized only their kind of 
mainstream journalism?  If the resulting codes had real teeth, 
they could provide a cheap way to disadvantage competitors.  
If so, couldn’t the Leveson approach potentially invite 
mainstream media industry protectionism? 277  Even if that 
were not the case, to the extent that the Royal Charter 
system would exempt some important digital participants 
while applying to others, it would effectively interfere in the 
evolution and structuring of the digital news space. 
Press reformers would argue that traditional ethical 
boundaries must be reinforced and policed precisely because 
of concerns about a likely increase in ethics violations by new 
journalists.  Regulation supporters would worry that a 
combination of the Internet-influenced “new journalism” and 
the economic pressures on the “old-school” press would lead to 
 
NEWS PEOPLE AT THE DAWN OF A NEW MILLENIUM 222 (David H. 
Weaver et al., 2007).  The rise of social, fact-based news is likely to lead to an 
increased amount of falsity, at a minimum because not all the participants have 
the professional training to avoid it.  Insufficiently sourced, ideologically biased, 
self-serving and inflammatory news accounts can all-too-easily make their way 
to millions of readers online.  Cohen, supra note 210, at 39–42 (describing right-
wing blogger Andrew Breitbart’s misleading story concerning Department of 
Agriculture employee Shirley Sherrod’s purported racism).  See also Derek 
Bambauer, Consider the Censor, 1 WAKE FOREST J. OF L. & POL’Y 34–42 (2011) 
(describing WikiLeaks and the dangers of control of information by small groups 
of cyber-activists). The global scope of networked journalism may also augment 
the need to engage in newsgathering in places with very different ethical norms 
for reporting.  See Zelizer, supra note 179. 
 277. Admittedly, the reality today is that the mainstream press is deeply 
enmeshed in figuring out the future of media, has already begun to participate 
in new approaches to the journalistic enterprise, and already incorporates the 
Internet and its audience in extensive ways.  Traditional newspapers are aware 
that they must share the field with new entrants, and are busy defining the 
“value added” they can provide in the future and the new curatorial and 
analytic role they are likely to play.  With it online initiatives, its acceptance of 
crowd-sourcing, and its openness to reader comments, the modern newspaper 
appears more open to the possibility of different ways of doing journalism.  Its 
publishers are unlikely to believe that they can effectively maintain a 
backward-looking place and status for old-fashioned newspapers by 
manipulating a journalistic code drafting process. 
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increases in irresponsibility and inaccuracy.278  Because many 
of the “new” journalists and news outlets do not have the kind 
of brand associated in the public mind, rightly or wrongly, 
with mainstream news organizations, the public does not 
have a “veracity proxy” on which it can rely.279  In addition to 
conferring special legitimacy on the included group, then, 
policing traditional boundaries could reduce the possibility of 
error and audience confusion. 
That important stories might be uncovered through 
means that a regulatory body might deem to violate a 
conventional journalism code does not necessarily deprive 
them of their significance in the public interest, however.  
The very changes in journalism that have been enabled by 
the digital environment arguably lead to much beneficial 
innovation as well.280 
The social benefits of the “new” journalism should not be 
ignored in the race to avoid its harms.  While the immediacy 
of Twitter may put pressure on journalistic standards of 
accuracy, the millions of Twitter users and 800 million 
Facebook subscribers can create a fact-checking matrix likely 
 
 278. One could reassuringly speculate that traditional press institutions 
could serve as a professionalizing influence on the potential excesses of the 
networked Fourth Estate.  Yet, it is not certain that the traditional institutional 
press will inevitably exert such a professionalizing influence—or do so in a 
desirable way. 
  The Leveson Report’s critique of the PCC reinforced the Justice’s view 
that purely voluntary self-regulation would not be successful.  See LEVESON 
REPORT, supra note 7, at Ch. 6, ¶ 2.5 et seq.  That is neither necessarily correct 
nor an insuperable difficulty.  There are many ways to measure the “success” of 
any self-regulatory scheme.  Id. at 755.  Some stack the deck.  The Leveson 
Report’s discussion of theories of regulation (see id. pt. K, ch. 6, at 1734 et seq.) 
does not adequately address this issue.  See Simon Jenkins, Cameron Is Right 
About Leveson, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 30, 2012) (“We do not say the burglary 
laws have “failed” just because burglary continues.”).  For an argument that the 
PCC’s apparent regulatory failure was attributable to inappropriate 
expectations of such an entity, see William Dutton, Save the Fourth Estate, LSE 
MEDIA POLICY PROJECT, (Oct. 11, 2013), available at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2013/10/11/william-dutton-save-the-
fourth-estate/.  Moreover, there may be ways of promoting better voluntary self-
regulation without going all the way to the kind of dangerous, continuing-
oversight regulatory regime as that enshrined by the Royal Charter approach. 
 279. Cohen, supra note 210, at 41–42.  That is increasingly less the case as 
well-established blogs earn their own reputational credibility.  Id. at 76 
(mentioning Talking Points Memo and SCOTUSblog as examples). 
 280. See, e.g., Tom Engelhardt, Are We in a New Golden Age of Journalism?, 
MOTHER JONES, (Jan. 21, 2014), available at 
http://www.motherjones.com/media/2014/01/new-golden-age-journalism-daily-
newspaper-rise-internet. 
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to combat the enhanced accountability challenges likely to 
arise in the modern journalistic ecosystem.281  Although 
online reporting may increase the likelihood of legal liability, 
it may also help promote a self-correcting marketplace of 
ideas.282  Citizen journalists, non-profit news purveyors, and 
other online actors provide desirable diversity in the 
perspectives from which they report the news.283  They can 
serve to enlarge the “sphere of legitimate debate” defined by 
the traditional press, and even open the door to some views 
from the “sphere of deviance” shunned by mainstream news 
organizations.284  An assessment of the press that does not 
speak to the complexities of the modern landscape is the 
poorer for it.  And press regulation that would target 
innovative new developments would disserve the public 
interest more than it would serve the goals articulated in the 
Leveson Report. 
Finally, to the extent that the goal of press reform is to 
reduce specific sorts of press behavior deemed inconsistent 
with privacy norms, recent history suggests that legal 
changes other than wholesale press reform can help achieve 
it.  For example, since changes to the Bribery Act in 2010 
have made it more difficult for journalists to pay for stories 
from the police and public officials, editors report that 
journalists have gone back to old-fashioned methods of 
journalism.285 
Because most citizen journalists are more vulnerable 
than the large institutional press to pressure and 
intimidation by the threat of lawsuits or fines, they are 
potentially more likely to self-censor—undermining the public 
interest.286  Even when that is not the case—and when it is 
 
 281. Levi, supra note 159. 
 282. Id.  See also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & 
Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000). 
 283. Cohen, supra note 210, at 5. 
 284. Jay Rosen, Audience Atomization Overcome: Why the Internet Weakens 
the Authority of the Press, PRESSTHINK, (Jan. 12, 2009), available at 
http://archive.pressthink.org/2009/01/12/atomization.html (describing Daniel 
Hallen’s model of American journalism as consisting of the sphere of consensus, 
the sphere of legitimate debate, and the sphere of deviance).  See also Cohen, 
supra note 210, at 5, 27 
 285. John Plunkett, Sun Editor: Journalists Have Gone Back To Traditional 
Methods, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 11, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/nov/11/sun-editor-journalists-david-
dinsmore. 
 286. Cohen, supra note 210, at 65–66.  Indeed, to the extent that the new 
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the traditional media that most wither under Leveson-type 
scrutiny—negative consequences might follow.  Specifically, 
to the extent that emergent journalism could benefit from the 
professional practices and ethics norms of traditional 
newspapers, a cowed and self-censored mainstream print 
press could not properly serve that norm-propagation 
function.  Moreover, effective censorship can undermine the 
ability of new entrants to develop institutional heft over time.  
In light of the diminishing power of the beleaguered 
traditional press, this would reinforce diminution in press 
power overall at the moment when a powerful press is most 
needed as a counterweight to government abuses of power.  
Roadblocks to the development of new press institutions 
should be resisted.287 
III. THE “MESSAGE” PROBLEM: WHAT SIGNAL IS THE 
U.K. SENDING ABROAD BY ITS PRESS REFORM 
EFFORTS? 
Numerous international news organizations have voiced 
concerns about the “message” sent to the world by Britain’s 
foray into press regulation.288 The principal argument of these 
 
media actors are the speech intermediaries, they may have little self-perception 
as First Amendment actors and slim commitment to press values. 
 287. See, e.g., Emily Bell, Clay Shirky & C.W. Anderson, Post-Industrial 
Journalism: Adapting to the Present, TOW CENTER FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM 
REPORT (Nov. 2012). 
 288. See, e.g., Jason Deans, Press Regulation: Seven Global Groups Urge 
Queen Not To Sign ‘Toxic’ Charter, THE GUARDIAN, (Oct. 24, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/24/press-regulation-queen-toxic-
charter (arguing that the “toxic” press reform Royal Charter would be nothing 
more than “camouflage for a “set of repressive statutory controls” being imposed 
on the industry against its will.”).  After the Charter was adopted despite that 
protest, WAN-IFRA sent an unprecedented delegation to the UK in response to 
“international concerns surrounding the situation for press freedom in the 
United Kingdom.”  Larry Kilman, World’s Press Examines UK Press Freedom, 
WAN-IFRA, (Jan. 17, 2014), available at http://www.wan-ifra.org/press-
releases/2014/01/17/world-s-press-examines-uk-press-freedom.  See also, supra 
note 3, infra note 289. 
  According to its website, WAN-IFRA “is the global organisation of the 
world’s newspapers and news publishers. It represents more than 18,000 
publications, 15,000 online sites and over 3,000 companies in more than 120 
countries.” Its core mission is to defend and promote “press freedom, quality 
journalism and editorial integrity and the development of prosperous 
businesses.”  See  Larry Kilman, About Wan-Ifra, WAN-IFRA, http://www.wan-
ifra.org/about-wan-infra.  The delegation’s mission  “highlighted serious 
concerns regarding the independence from political involvement in that process, 
and how implementation of the legislation that underpins the Royal Charter 
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non-UK journalists and editors is that the diminution in 
British press freedom sends a highly repressive signal to 
other countries.289  In its recent report criticizing the Royal 
Charter, WAN-IFRA adverted to “growing evidence, reported 
by the WAN-IFRA membership, that the British approach—
either in terms of regulation, or in the misuse of terrorism 
and national security legislation—is being used by repressive 
regimes to excuse their own practices toward the Press.”290 
Many countries in the world are far less protective of free 
speech and press than Britain.  Under those circumstances, a 
repressive signal from the U.K. is problematic in two ways.  
The first is that some governments seeking to rein in their 
press might cite or gain inspiration from the British example 
in order to adopt their own “reforms.”291  WAN-IFRA points to 
“the UK’s continued influence over developing nations where 
media are essential for the spread of democratic values[.]”292  
The Campaign to Protect Journalists (CPJ)—a group of 
American reporters and editors—highlighted a variety of 
attempts to control the “irresponsible” press by countries as 
far flung as South Africa, Hungary and Russia.293  It is 
 
could potentially be abused to restrict a free press both here in the UK and 
abroad.”  News Release, World’s Press Examines UK Press Freedom, WAN-
IFRA, Jan. 17, 2014, available at http://www.wan-ifra.org/press-
releases/2014/01/17/world-s-press-examines-uk-press-freedom. 
 289. Id. (“The mission highlighted WAN-IFRA’s concern that general 
confusion surrounding changes to the self-regulation system for the press in the 
United Kingdom, coupled with the government’s chilling intimidation of The 
Guardian, is sending a negative message to the international community. That 
foreign governments may cite the current British example when reforming their 
own regulatory processes, as well as the inspiration they may take in how to 
treat investigative journalism, remain of particular concern and risks causing 
serious repercussions worldwide.”).  WAN-IFRA also pointed to the U.K. 
government’s “chilling intimidation of the Guardian.”  Id. 
 290. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4 at 28. 
 291. See, e.g., Anri Van Der Spuy & Emma Goodman, The Leveson Report 
Anniversary: A Celebration or a Commemoration?, LSE MEDIA PROJECT BLOG, 
(Dec. 2, 2013), available at 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2013/12/02/the-leveson-report-
anniversary-a-celebration-or-a-commemoration/ (citing Article 19 legal counsel 
position that “[m]any other countries that may be evaluating the ways in which 
they govern their press systems are watching what is going on in the UK . . . .”). 
 292. WAN-IFRA, PRESS FREEDOM, supra note 4. 
 293. Van Der Spuy & Goodman, supra note 291.  In fact, the group revealed 
that a Russian lawmaker had “seized on the British example to propose the 
creation of a Russian media regulator . . . with powers to censure, fine, and even 
close down news outlets, bypassing the judicial system.”  UK Urged To 
Reconsider Post-Leveson Media Proposals, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT 
JOURNALISTS, (Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://cpj.org/2013/04/uk-urged-to-
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notable in this connection that the Leveson approach is said 
to be more extensive and coercive than most other Press 
Councils in Europe.294 At a minimum, without such a signal, 
countries seeking to control their press might have incentives 
to be less blatant in their efforts. 
Second, and most notably, press-repressive states can 
also use British press reform as a weapon to blunt criticism of 
their press control regimes.  Former Guardian editor Peter 
Preston warns that “[i]t matters . . . what messages the 
process [of press regulation] sends to foreign states where 
democracy has frailer roots.”295  Operating under a potentially 
repressive press regime deprives the U.K. of its moral high 
ground on the subject.  As the CPJ recently warned the 
British Prime Minister, press regulation could erode British 
“moral authority” to object to press censorship in other 
countries, particularly former members of the British 
empire.296  Having succumbed to press regulation subverts 
Britain’s ability to promote the value of an untrammeled 
press world-wide. 
 
reconsider-post-leveson-media-proposal.php. 
 294. Lara Fielden, Regulating the Press: A Comparative Study of 
International Press Councils, REUTERS INSTITUTE, (Apr. 2012), available at 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/documents/Publications/Work
ing_Papers/Regulating_the_Press.pdf. 
 295. Preston, supra note 229. 
 296. See Rowena Mason, American journalists urge David Cameron to drop 
press regulation plans, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Apr. 3, 2013) (“Campaign to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ) urges Mr. Cameron to “step back” from creating a new 
regulator as it would set a bad example to repressive dictatorships.”).  The 
CPJ’s directors include senior figures from ABC News, NBC, Bloomberg, the 
Chicago Tribune, The N.Y. Times, CBS News, The New Yorker, The 
Washington Post, the Nation, Getty Images and the Miami Herald.  Dan 
Rather, Arianna Huffington, and Paul Steiger, president of ProPublica, sit on 
the CPJ’s board.  Id.  
  Some Leveson proponents argue that the only reason other countries 
could use UK press reform to justify their own repression of the press is because 
the press has misled the world by its distorted reporting on the Royal Charter.  
See, e.g., Steven Barnett, Leveson Past, Present and Future: The Politics of Press 
Regulation, THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY No. 3, at 353, July-Sep. 2013; Angela 
Phillips, Distorting The Debate On Media Reform, INFORRM’S BLOG (Jan. 18, 
2014), available at http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/01/18/distorting-the-
debate-on-media-reform-angela-phillips/.  That the British proposal does not 
entail direct state regulation of the press does not mean that it cannot serve as 
an excuse for more authoritarian regimes to justify and deflect criticism of their 
far more draconian press control regimes.  Moreover, whatever the substantive 
merits of the point, however, the reality is that a message has been sent to the 
world that the British are willing to engage in regulation of the press (at least to 
a much greater degree than heretofore). 
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CONCLUSION 
The phone-hacking scandal of 2011 served as an occasion 
for British consideration of an experiment in “voluntary self-
regulation” of the press backed up by Royal Charter 
underpinning.  Had Lord Justice Leveson, author of the 
regime, limited his review to how to pass and enforce laws 
that would minimize press reliance on illegal “dark arts” 
(such as phone-hacking, blagging, purchase of information 
from public officials, door-stepping etc.),297 the proposed press 
reforms would have been unexceptionable.  But, instead, the 
reform approach sought to discipline the press and promote 
“responsibility.”  It became “a classic example of overkill[.]”298  
Instead of increased press responsibility, its most significant 
impact is likely to be enhanced press timorousness at the very 
moment when courageous reporting is most necessary to keep 
states and their agents in check. 
British press reform revises the balance of power 
between the press, the government and the political elite in 
ways that are likely to “protect secrets—personal, political, 
and corporate—that only an irreverent press is likely to ferret 
out.”299  This is not simply about controlling tabloid excesses; 
the impact of the Royal Charter regime will not be limited to 
the tabloids.  Nor can it realistically be about protecting 
privacy of the press’ victims, as the worldwide dissemination 
of information over the Internet undermines British ability to 
constrain publication.  The particular provisions of the 
system—although structured with Rube Goldberg complexity 
to appear to avoid state control—in fact promise a significant 
chilling effect on British newspapers. 
The chill is likely to be felt far beyond British borders.  
Journalists world-wide are already subject to physical danger, 
death threats, imprisonment, and lawsuits—reporting under 
increasingly dangerous conditions today.300  Government 
threats against journalism today are more extensive and 
powerful than ever.  We live in the time of both the 
 
 297. See Levi, supra note 159. 
 298. Lester, supra note 203, at 189–90. 
 299. Burns, supra note 5. 
 300. See, e.g., Maya Taal, CPJ Risk List: Where Press Freedom Suffered, 
COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS, available at 
https://cpj.org/2014/02/attacks-on-the-press-cpj-risk-list-1.php (cataloguing 
dangers to journalists and roadblocks to reporting inter alia from Russia, 
Turkey, China, Ecuador, Syria). 
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surveillance state—engaging in massive surveillance of 
populations—and also the security state—resisting disclosure 
of state programs of mass surveillance on security grounds.  
The state in turn deploys both public and private power to 
achieve its ends.  Under such circumstances, it is unduly 
optimistic to contend that structures with the potential for 
press control will not be used to the full extent of their 
influence.  The new regulatory strategies available to states 
must also be assessed in light of the increasing economic 
threats facing news organizations, and the uncertainties 
created by a rapidly-changing digital news landscape.  
Initiatives like British press regulation, no matter how 
measured they appear on their face, pose a profound threat to 
journalistic freedom everywhere. 
